The Area Rule: Richard Whitcomb Concept

This is the story of a brilliant young engineer who would radically change the way aircraft were designed in the future. A story about a radical new idea in aircraft development: the Area Rule Concept. Most importantly, this is the story of a man and a concept that combined, would revolutionize aircraft designs forever. Richard T. Whitcomb was born in the small town of Evanston, Illinois on February 21st, 1921. Since early in his childhood, Whitcomb was highly influenced by his paternal grandfather who had known the great American inventor Thomas A. Edison. He would sit with his grandfather for hours and hear him tell story after story about the great inventor’s life. Such was the influence of Mr. Edison in young Whitcomb’s life that he decided to study mechanical engineering right after high school. He enrolled at Worcester Polytechnic Institute. He proceeded to graduate with honors with a degree in the complex field of mechanical engineering. In the summer of 1943 Whitcomb was hired to perform data gathering tests at the famous National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Langley Aeronautical Laboratory at Hampton, Virginia. Young Whitcomb did not know it at the time, but his work at the prestigious Laboratory would eventually lead him to become one of America’s premier aerodynamic engineers. His innovative theories would launch a new era in America’s aircraft design.

The late 1940s saw Langley’s wind tunnels used extensively on high speed research. Test pilot Chuck Yeager broke the sound barrier in 1947 with a Bell X-1 aircraft first tested in Langley’s wind tunnel facility. His accomplishment ushered in the era of supersonic flight, and it also pushed speed as a dominating factor in a combat aircraft’s design. It was at this time that Whitcomb was assigned to the Laboratory’s secret eight foot transonic wind tunnel. Within a few years of laboring there, young Whitcomb developed a reputation as an innovative thinker, a man that thought “outside the box” when it came to an aircraft’s aerodynamic characteristics. In the early part of 1950, Whitcomb immersed himself in high speed aerodynamic drag research. He soon realized that the physics of an airflow changed violently as it expanded from subsonic to supersonic speeds. By late 1950, after extensive research, Whitcomb developed a theory that directly concerned the wing shape as it related to the aircraft’s overall drag profile. The wing area, he proclaimed, should be reduced in an effort to smooth the expanding airflow and mitigate the formation of shock waves that produced a high drag profile. To better explain his concept, Whitcomb studied extensively the design of artillery shells and machine guns bullets. Their smooth distribution of what is known as the Cross Sectional Area, in order to reduce the drag profile at supersonic speeds, appealed to him. Whitcomb came away from this unorthodox study with a clear vision: in order to reduce the drag profile of an aircraft, the plane needed to maintain a smooth distribution of cross sectional area in the region of the wing structure, thus reducing the drag profile of the aircraft. To compensate for the increase in cross section at the wing location, the fuselage section would have to be reduced accordingly, thus giving the airframe a waisted “coke bottle” shape. This breakthrough idea later became known as the Area Rule Concept.

As with many new theories, the Area Rule Concept encountered its fair amount of skepticism in aerodynamics engineering circles. As a result, Whitcomb’s research began to encounter a number of obstacles from colleagues and upper management, fortunately for him and the US Air Force, Adolph Busemann stepped in. Busemann, a well respected German aerodynamicist who was also working at NACA at the time, gave his full support to the newly presented area rule concept. With this impressive backing, Whitcomb was once again free to pursue his idea. He carried out a number of wind tunnel experiments during the fall of 1952 that validated his theory. Indeed, much of the collected data from these tests showed that the large drag rise encountered near Mach 1 was reduced almost 60 percent when the fuselage section was sufficiently reduced in the neighborhood of the wing structure. Although impressive as they were, these results were not immediately embraced by the US aircraft industry. With his research testing almost stopped by outside interference, Whitcomb again received unexpected help. This time in the form of Convair’s YF-102 supersonic fighter. The YF-102 aircraft applied a delta wing configuration in an effort to reduce the plane’s drag profile at supersonic speeds. Initial testing of the completed sample plane demonstrated that although designed to fly at speeds above Mach 1, the aircraft simply could not achieve its intended threshold because the transonic drag profile rise was too great for even the powerful Pratt & Whitney J-57 turbojet engine to overcome. It was at this moment that Whitcomb’s concept came to prominence. Convair’s engineers began to research ways to improve the aircraft’s drag profile. Their research, lead them directly to NACA and Whitcomb. They met with Whitcomb and, after carefully examination of the area rule concept’s wind tunnel data, the engineers modified the original YF-102 airframe with an area ruled fuselage. The new aircraft, YF-102A made its maiden flight on the morning of December 20th, 1954. The aircraft out-performed expectations. The area rule concept had increased the fighter’s top speed by an astonishing 25 percent. The US Air Force was so impressed with the new aircraft’s speed and characteristics, that they placed an order for 870 F-102As.

The success of Whitcomb’s concept also meant that it would become classified material. It remained a classified project until September 1955. Two months later, with his work in the public light, Whitcomb was awarded the prestigious Collier Trophy. He lived the rest of his life with the knowledge that he changed aircraft design forever.

- Raul Colon

More information:
Skunk Works, Ben R. Rich & Leo Janos; Back Bay Books 1994
Alpha, Bravo, Delta Guide to the U.S. Air Force, Walter J. Boyne; Penguin Group 2003
U.S. Air Force: A Complete History, Lieutenant Colonel Dick Allan Daso USAF (Ret); The Air Force Historical Foundation 2006

The Bombing of the Sir Galahad

The Falklands War ended more than twenty five years ago and still today we do not have a full account of what happened on the Falklands in 1982. Details of the battles, the exchanges of fire, even the deployment of troops and equipment that occurred during the conflict are mostly incomplete. This fact could be attributed to the relative small impact that the Falklands campaign had on the world stage or the fact that it was not as “dramatic” as others wars. Or maybe it was the fact that the war was being waged during a transitional time, the era of cable news channels and 24-7 news networks were beginning to emerge, thus its coverage was not as conventional as it was during World War II, Korea or even Vietnam. Whatever the fact was, there’s still much to learn about the conflict. There were one particular strike that needs to be reviewed and studied further: the case of the Sir Galahad.

The Sir Galahad was a Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Landing Ship Logistics (LSL). It was commissioned in 1967 and was deployed to the Falklands war theater in 1982. On the night of June 6th a series of sea transfers left the Galahad and another British warship, the Sir Tristam, exposed in an undefended inlet, Port Pleasant, on the south coast of the Falklands. On the morning of June 7th, with the sky clear of cloud cover, the newly arrived Galahad was filled with combat troops and equipment ready for disembarking. Argentine troops on Mount Harriet, a full ten miles away, were observing the Tristram’s movements during the 6th. When they returned to their observation post on the morning hours of the 7th, they were surprised to see another British warship, the Galahad, stationed even closer to their position than the Tristram was a day before. The spotters immediately reported the sighting to command headquarters and they soon afterwards ordered a major air strike against the exposed British LSL ship Galahad. Eight Skyhawks and six Daggers of the 5th and 6th Argentine Fighter Groups were loaded with contact bombs and dispatched to attack the LSL from the south entrance of the inlet. A Learjet was launched to provide the strike group with accurate navigational information. Preceding the arrival of the initial strike package would be four Mirages of the 8th Fighter Group. Their mission was to simulate a low level incursion along the north coast of the islands and then turn away. This strike package would act as a decoy. Their assignment was to lure the British Sea Harrier combat patrols away from the incoming Skyhawks and Daggers.

In the early morning hours of the 7th, the main attack package departed. On their way to the target, three Skyhawks, including both flight leaders, and a Dagger; turned back due to mechanical problems. Meanwhile, the Mirage decoy package was commencing its simulated bomb run. They were successful in attracting the attention of the British Sea Harrier patrols circling overhead the two exposed ships. The package lead attack element was the Dagger asset. Five Daggers were in position to commence their strike profile when the lead element spotted another warship in the eastward vicinity of Port Pleasant. She was the Royal Navy’s frigate Plymouth. The Dagger’s leader decided to turn his formation towards the unsuspecting ship. Each of the five aircraft made a bomb run on the ship’s port side. The vessel was hit with four contact bombs. None of them exploded – a common problem that plagued Argentine’s free-fall bomb arsenal during the war. The Plymouth fired her anti-aircraft guns, hitting one Dagger on the wing structure. After the brief attack, all the Daggers returned safely to their base on the mainland.

As a result of the Dagger’s variation of the profile order, the Skyhawks were left alone with the task of attacking the Galahad. The Skyhawks were helped by the Dagger’s attack on the Plymouth. By the time the five members of the Skyhawks package were commencing their bomb runs, the British air patrol had left the Galahad area, leaving the two ships almost undefended. After reaching their target site, the ‘Hawks dropped down to sea level in an effort to evade the British tracking radar systems. They accelerated to 500 mph. As they approached the Galahad, the leader of the package, First Lieutenant Cachon, spotted a Sea Lynx helicopter near a hill overlooking the inlet. He ordered his team to take evasive action in order to miss the Lynx and avoid detection. They accomplished that task by diving into the inlet’s south side and staying low. As they did this, the British ground troops north of Fitzroy Bay, started to fire at the flight of ‘Hawks. The British even fired a couple of anti-aircraft missiles at the package. The flight immediately banked to the left, at an angle of 30 degree. When they completed their turn, the Galahad was just in front of them. The five Skyhawks began to deploy their bomb load. Two ‘Hawks bombed a vehicle on the Galahad’s deck destroying it. The remaining three aircraft, after watching their teammates attacking the Galahad, decided to attack the Tristram.

After their bomb run was over, Cachon and his team had made one of the best executed Argentine air strikes of the conflict. The relative small number of anti-aircraft guns on the Galahad, enabled the package to come in at a sufficiently high altitude to allow their bombs time to arm in flight. Three bombs fell on the Galahad. A couple of explosions followed and then a huge fire erupted. In all, forty-eight men were killed that day on the Galahad. The ship was completely gutted. Only one of the two bombs that hit the Tristram exploded. Although it caused less structural damage to the ship, it killed two sailors on board. When the ‘Hawks returned to their home base and reported what had just occured, the Argentine high command decided to deploy four additional aircraft in an effort to inflict more damage to the British Navy. The four aircraft that were to attempt the attack were also Skyhawks from the 4th Fighter Group. They departed their mainland base en route to engage the crippled Galahad and hopefully, the Tristram. On their way there, they passed above British units conducting combat operations around Fitzroy. The British fired a barrage of heavy anti-aircraft fire including the launching of some Rapier missiles. The four attacking ‘Hawks were all damaged, forcing them to return back to their base. Due to the extent of the damage, the aircraft were only able to fly as far as the Argentine base at San Julian near the coast.

The last Argentine sortie of the day achieved a minor success. Four ‘Hawks of the 5th Fighter Group flying in a back-up capacity, found a British landing craft in the Choiseul Sound. The first two ‘Hawks on the package strafed the craft with cannon fire. The result was the destruction of the small craft and the killing of the six men that where in it. A pair of Sea Harriers patrolling the area where the Argentine’s initial attack occurred, spotted the Argentine fighters striking around the destroyed landing craft. They proceeded to engage the ‘Hawks with Sidewinder missiles. One ‘Hawk was destroyed immediately while the second Argentine fighter was cut by another missile. Another ‘Hawk was also hit by the incoming Sidewinder. In all, three Skyhawks were destroyed and the three pilots were killed. This action ended the air engagement between the British and Argentines for the day. As the news trickled down, the Argentineans started celebrating their surprising victory over the mighty Royal Navy while the British commenced the painful process of identifying their comrades killed. The actions of June 7th, 1982 paved the way for an improvement in British air combat patrols and operations above their fleet. It also helped fuel the impression on the part of the Argentineans that they could engage and inflict damage to the vaunted Royal Navy.

- Raul Colon

More information:
Fight For The Falklands – Twenty Years On
“SIR GALAHAD” & “SIR TRISTRAM” BOMBED

The Aircraft goes to Sea!

At the time when the Wright Brothers flew their famous Flyer aircraft at Kitty Hawk, NC; the navies of the world were still centered on the mighty Dreadnought – a massive battleship that dwarfed anything on the seas. As the development of aircraft proceeded, naval strategists around the world found this revolutionary new tool of war merely interesting at best. They were obsessed with the idea of a Blue Water Navy that could smash any foe with its big naval guns. If any thought was put on using the aircraft in any naval operation, it was in the reconnaissance role. Projects popped up all over Europe and the United States in the early 1910s, looking into the possibility of using seaboard planes as spotters on capital ships such as battleships and heavy cruisers. Later, the perceived ability of aircraft to inflict substantial damage to ships at sea outdid those plans. Ideas began floating into how best to utilize this new weapon and how it could be deployed in a manner that would offer the aircraft the ability to strike deep at an enemy’s naval force.

The pioneer force behind the development of a naval aviation policy was the United States Navy. The US Navy was behind Glenn Curtiss’s ground breaking take-off test performed from a provisional platform installed on the USS Birmingham on a cloudy morning in November, 1910. This eventful test was followed by an equally impressive landing on a similar platform aboard the USS Pennsylvania the following January. As promising as these experiments were, the US Navy top brass failed to fully grasp the potential a sea based aircraft could offer. Across the Atlantic, the British Royal Navy did show interest in the Curtiss experiments and its ramifications. They promptly commenced a series of projects with the goal of taking-off and landing an aircraft on a sea-based ship – not an easy proposition at the time. Preliminary decks installed on pre-Dreadnought battleships were too short for landing, and more importantly, landing on a moving surface presented more difficulties for the pilots. On the other hand, seaplanes with floats represented a more functional platform for naval operations. The Royal Navy did operational maneuvering in mid-1913, using seaplanes to screen for HMS Hermes in fleet exercises. Still, the reconnaissance role of the aircraft dominated the thinking of top naval officials around the globe. That does not mean that offensive experimentation with aircraft halted. In 1914, a 1.5 powder gun was tested in-flight for the first time, as was the first test for an airborne torpedo. Then in 1915 the US Navy deployed the first operational shipboard compressed-air powered catapult system. By 1914, dedicated seaplane-carrier ships were beginning to be deployed by the British Royal Navy. They mainly were converted merchant ships, with slow speeds that made them unable to keep up with the battle fleet.

Naval aviation forever changed when in 1915, HMS Ben-My-Chree launched a Short Type 184 seaplane for the world’s first operational torpedo run – an attack against an Ottoman freighter on the Dardanelles. Further experiments with seaplanes and their tenders proved that, although seaplanes could offer the navy enhanced capabilities, they lacked the necessary power, stamina, and payload to directly affect a naval battle. That role was for land-based aircraft. As we have seen, landing planes on a moving platform in the 1910s was considered extremely difficult at best. Extended platforms needed to be designed and produced in order to accommodate the take-off and landing of aircraft at sea. As in the case of the torpedo attack, the British took the lead in tackling the problem. Installing a wooden take-off deck in the bow of the light cruiser HMS Furious. Although take-offs from this deck were a relative easy proposition for experienced pilots, landing on them was a different story. Thus, the Royal Navy augmented the deck structure to cover the ships after section, but turbulence from the cruiser’s superstructure made the landing approaches tenuous for incoming pilots. Nevertheless, in July 1918, seven Sopwith Camel aircraft took-off from the deck of the Furious to strike Zeppelins bases – eventually destroying two of the massive airships in their pens. The era of the carrier was officially born on that July day. Encouraged by the results of this first attack, the Royal Navy completely rebuilt the Furious superstructure, converting it into what today we can call a conventional aircraft carrier. But the Furious’s life as the only operational carrier was brief. The Royal Navy promptly followed the Furious conversion with the launching of the first ever “true aircraft carrier”, on Her Majesty’s Ship Argus.

While America’s military participation in the Great War was brief; the US Navy forces did train, and eventually served alongside Britain’s vaunted Grand Fleet in 1918. The incorporation of US battle squadrons into the Grand Fleet gave US commanders a unique view of the carrier’s ability to project power over vast distances. Promptly, after the end of World War I, the United States Navy ordered the collier Jupiter to be converted into the US’s first operational carrier: the USS Langley. The Covered Wagon, as the Langley was commonly known to those who served on it, was just basically a flush deck with two massive hinged funnels on the port side. The former coal holds were converted to crew quarters, storerooms, and workshops. The forward upper deck was utilized as the carrier’s hangar. Although she served with the US Navy’s main Battle Fleet, the Langley was mainly utilized as a test-bed system. Various experiments where performed on the Langley, principally the use of arrester mechanisms for capturing incoming planes. Initially, the “Covered Wagon” used a British supplied Longitudinal Wire system to recover inbound aircraft. With wires running lengthwise, this simple mechanism was engaged by the aircraft’s hooks at landing (the hooks were located on their landing gear) to prevent the aircraft from swinging to either side after the violent landing maneuver. The US Navy augmented the Longitudinal system with their own Transverse Wire system – with wires running across the deck, side to side. The Transverse system operated in a similar way to the British system, the major different being that with Transverse, the inbound aircraft is subject to a retarding landing force at the moment the hooks connect with the secure wire on deck. The retarding effect is achieved by hanging shell cases filled with sand on each end of the wire retainer. After being refined to operate with hydraulic power, the Transverse Wire system has become the mainstay on carrier operations today.

Additional improvements were made to the original Argus concept by the US Navy. A flush mounted catapult system was added to the Langley. The catapults, installed on the flight deck, were initially intended to give a take-off boost to seaplanes operating on board. Naval engineers were soon to realize that this same concept could be modified for use by conventional aircraft. Eventually, like the Transverse system, the catapult mechanism became the main take-off procedure for aircraft in all carriers. Further development was performed on the Langley, developments that we can sea on today’s futuristic aircraft carriers designs. It is fair to say that if the British came up with the initial concept idea for a carrier, the United States was in fact the real force in the development of this new weapon platform. An unprecedented platform that has ruled the seas and the air for over sixty years.

- Raul Colon

More information:
A Brief History of U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers Part I — The Early Years
Carriers: Airpower at Sea: Chapter 1 – The Early Years

The Ural bomber Concept: Wever’s Dream

Every major-power air force since the middle of the Great War has possessed a tactical and strategic component. The British Royal Flying Corp, the predecessor of the famous Royal Air Force, developed during World War I a strategic component centered on the idea that a heavy bomber could penetrate the enemy’s air defenses and submit them to an aerial pounding that would reduce their ability to produce, supply and field their ground and naval forces. Beside Great Britain, France, Italy and Imperial Germany implemented, in one form or another; the concept of strategic bombing during the war. When the war ended in 1918, only the victorious allies were able to maintain and expand these concepts. During the inter war years, the idea of strategic bombing gained valuable allies in the UK, France and the United States. Many experiments and trials were conducted leading to efforts to develop and produce long range platforms, bombers, capable of taking the war to the enemy’s farther reaches. The situation was not similar in Germany.

Unable to field a regular air force due to the terms of the Versailles Treaty, the new Nazi regime in Germany started to improvise ways to develop a different type of air arm – an air force mainly designed to cover and support ground troops engaging in rapid maneuvers. That this newly designed air arm lacked the vital strategic component can be attributed to several reasons. Mainly that the early Nazi military doctrine of employing rapid panzer formations in open fields would require the use of much of their available air assets in a support role, is the one most attributed to this shortcoming, but there was another, less reported situation that ended up costing the Luftwaffe more than it’s doctrine. There have been many reports and papers written about the strategic shortcomings of the Luftwaffe, but seldom did these papers mention the name of Walther Wever – yet, if he would had lived, his strategic vision might have altered the course of World War II. Wever was a fierce proponent of strategic bombing. He possessed both the vision and the willpower to built a strategic air fleet out of the Luftwaffe – fortunately for the Allies he died before the war started. If not, one can just imagine what aircraft and tactics Wever could have employed in the Battle of Britain or in the invasion of the Soviet Union.

Wever was born in the eastern province of Posen – a product of a middle class environment. When he became eligible, he joined the army as an infantry officer. After completing his training, he was commissioned as second lieutenant. The rank on which he would enter the Great War with. During that terrible conflict, Wever displayed an above average intelligence, valor and superior organization skills. These traits propelled him to the rank of captain and eventually to a post in the staff of the famous German military commander, General Erich Ludendorff. There he is credited with the development of the so called “elastic defense” strategy employed very effectively by the German army all throughout the conflict. The defense called for the abandonment of forward positions during artillery bombardments, making the Allies feel more secure for their advance once the bombardment was over. A strategic troop build-up was placed near the threatened area, passionately awaiting the advancing and unsuspecting Allies’ armies. The strategy was so successful that after the war, French military historians credited it with the breaking of their army’s will to fight in The Somme and other places. Wever’s stock rose during the dull interwar years. He achieved the rank of colonel and in early 1932, was appointed Germany’s Air Command Officer. A title used to deceive the watchful Allies. The reality was that the new command given to Wever amounted to a Chief of the Air Force in the current military lexicon. At forty-six, without any flying training, Wever was now the overall commander of Germany’s air force.

Even before Adolf Hitler sealed the fate of Germany by going to war, Wever understood that the next armed conflict would be a tactical as well as a strategic one. Adhering to his vision, Wever steered the German air industry into developing what he saw as its most precious asset in the next war: a four-engined heavy bomber. The bomber Wever envisioned would have been able to carry a payload of some 3,300 pounds to a distance of at least 1,240 miles. In developing the concept for such an aircraft, Wever had only one enemy in mind: Soviet Russia. He understood what many of his peers and eventual successors failed to see. In order to take the war into the Russian industry, buried deep behind the Ural Mountains, Germany needed an aircraft able to subject those industries to a heavy bombardment that could disrupt the flow of aircraft, tanks, truck, artillery pieces and other tools of war; into the frontlines – the destruction of the enemy’s means of war production. He clearly saw that in order to defeat the air force of a country such as Russia, where the sheer amount of aircraft available to them could had overwhelmed Germany’s fighter force, they would need to destroy the industry that made those aircraft, instead of shooting them out of the skies. Here was the British Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Frederick Sykes’s strategic vision at its most basic. The objectives of the new German air force would not only be concentrated on the support of its ground and naval forces, although Wever was a passionate believer in a mixed-mission and completely independent Luftwaffe, but it would take the tools of war to the enemy’s nerve centers, the troop staging areas, rear bases, their industries and in the end, their population as a whole. This concept of total air war was first promulgated by Sykes in December 1918.

For all of his vision, strategies and directions, Wever’s views were in the minority in the German air force. The most senior Luftwaffe commanders saw little need for the development of a strategic heavy force, although they changed their minds when the British and American heavy bombers began to pound their beloved country. Following Wever’s lead, Germany’s air industry began to conceive plans for the design and production of a fleet of heavy bombers. Two proud German companies, Junkers and Dornier put forward design sketches for a heavy level bomber in late 1934. On January 3rd, 1935, Junker’s chairman, Dr. Heinrich Koppenberg; reported to Colonel Wilhelm Wimmer, head of the Luftwaffe Technical Department and fierce backer of Wever; that a preliminary design for the new bomber, designated Ju 89, had been completed. Dornier followed a couple of months later. On a clear morning in October 28th, 1936, the much anticipated Do 19 made its maiden flight. The Ju 89 followed two months later. But by this time, fate had intervened. On June 3rd, 1936, Wever was in Dresden addressing a gathering of Luftwaffe cadets when he received the news of the passing of a World War I German hero. He decided to leave the city immediately in order to attend the funeral. Wever took off on his He 70 airplane. As the plane started to climb, one wing tipped on the ground propelling the aircraft into a mad tailspin that ended with a fiery crash. Wever and his flight engineer died immediately. With his prematurely passing, his dream, that of a well balanced tactical and strategic Luftwaffe; also died. Without Wever’s vision and relentless drive to pursue, Germany fell behind its main adversaries in the development of a heavy bomber platform.

Wever’s successors were more “yes”-type officers. More eager to please the Luftwaffe’s Chief Commander Herman Goering than in establishing a balanced force. From June 1936 onwards, the main effort of the Luftwaffe’s aircraft development programs was concentrated on the design and production of aircraft capable of providing the German army with a close air support arm. Nearly all of the heavy bomber development resources were diverted to the development of dive bombers. Even the much anticipated and needed He 177 was not ordered into full-scale production until the four-engined plane was refitted to operate as a dive bombing platform. It’s safe to say that with the death of General Wever, the dream of developing a multi-faceted air force, an air force capable of providing Germany with the same kind of capability as the Royal Air Force and the US Army Air Forces possessed, died also. There were many aspects of discrepancy between the Allies combat air philosophy and that of Germany’s air arm, but what separates them most profoundly was the strategic aspect of their respective philosophies. The Allies truly believed in the importance of strategic bombing to their overall war effort, while the Germans were more focused on the tactical aspect. Had Wever lived, maybe the Luftwaffe’s philosophy and the product of this philosophy would have been more balanced.

- Raul Colon

More information:
wikipedia: Walther Wever (general)