The Forgotten Visionary

When we think about strategic bombing doctrine, and its early proponents and converts within the United States armed forces, we naturally thought of men of such status as the famous and controversial William “Billy” Mitchell or the colorful Benjamin “Benny” Foulois – seldom, if ever, does the name of Edgar S. Gorrell come to our mind. A sad example of what writers called “phantom lagoons”. In those early days of aviation, when writers tended to enlarge the personal profiles of anyone who could achieve a milestone in this new field of human endeavor, some names gathered more recognitions than others. This type of reporting or writing only enhanced the profile of those controversial and colorful characters, leaving other equally important names in the history of aviation in a historical lagoon. One of those men stuck in the phantom lagoon was Colonel Edgar S. Gorrell of the US Air Service.

Gorrell began his military service after graduating from the US Military Academy at West Point in the spring of 1912. After a relatively un-distinguished Army career, Gorrell decided to enlist in the infant Air Service when the US declared war on the Central Powers in April 1917. Two months later, Gorrell was deployed to France as part of the spearhead of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). His unit, the Bolling Mission, arrived at the French capital in July of the same year, well ahead of the AEF main force. In France, young Gorrell was assigned to the new US Air Service Technical Section. The Section’s main objective was the development of an attack and bombing strategy to be implemented against German targets deep inside the Kaiser’s homeland. Here is where the first steps towards the US air strategic doctrine, a policy that has dominated America’s air campaign strategy since then, began to take shape. Heavily influenced by the great British’s strategic visionary Major General Hugh M. Trenchard, who was at the time head of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and his liaison at Paris, Major Lord Tiverton, who in September 1917 had proposed to the RFC that a new and more destructive type of aerial assault be implemented in order to submit ordinary Germans to the full power of the Allies new weapons; Gorrell began to form the outlines of what could have become the main US strategic bombing campaign plan on the Western Front. By October, Gorrell’s outlines had become a more serious technical proposal than he originally thought, one that he presented to the AEF commanders in mid November 1917. The proposal called for a massive bombing campaign against German troop concentrations, dockyards, industrial areas and major population centers deep inside Germany itself. The new American plan, as the paper was later known, utilized all of Tiverton’s four main concepts first presented to the RFC in September. The first of these concepts was the determination of bombing targets, distances, enemy offensive and defensive capabilities around them, projected casualties figures and weather patterns around the selected zone. Next was the evaluation of America’s, and its Allies, overall air resources and capabilities assigned to the determined objective. This was followed by logistical studies and planning implementation mechanisms. Last, Gorrell encouraged commanders to plan their assaults on areas where the impact of saturation heavy bombing would cause the greatest effect to German civilian moral, which was the plan’s original combat target.

The similarities between Tiverton’s and Gorrell’s papers were one of the reasons that the name of Gorrell is seldom known outside military aviation historians today. As the American Plan moved up through the chain of command, it gained more and more converts among field commanders, and although the Plan was not implemented because of aircraft production shortages and training shortfalls, it was of such depth that it went on to serve as the cornerstone of the US Army Air Corp’s bombing doctrine during the Second World War. In the early months of 1918, before the great German offensives of the spring, Gorrell wrote a second paper titled “The Future Role of American Bombardment Aviation”. This paper followed almost the same path as the American plan. It called for the same four principals when preparing to engage an enemy with aerial power. But by the time the paper was ready for serious consideration, an Armistice was signed in a railway car outside Versailles ending the War to End all Wars, and thus the paper was relegated to some obscure long term planning divisions. De-mobilization was at top of the American commanders minds, but this did not mean that the two papers were neglected or even ignored, in fact, the opposite occurred. During the inter-war years, much of Gorrell’s visionary ideas were implemented in the Army Air Corps Tactical Manual, forming the backbone of the US air effort little more than twenty years later.

Edgar Gorrell’s natural traits helped him shape American military aviation tactics for decades. His selflessness enabled him to incorporate foreign-developed concepts into his own ideas and his analytical mind made him redefine those concepts and apply them to the American reality, thus forming a new thesis on the use of American air power. A thesis that would dominate US Air Force’s strategic doctrine ever since those months in 1917.

- Raul Colon

References:
1 U.S. Air Force: A Complete History, Air Force Historical Foundation 2006
2 Air Power: The Men, Machines and Ideas that Revolutionized War, Stephen Budiansky, Penguin Books 2004

The Graceful EC-121 Early Warning Star

Embed the most advanced electronic detection systems within the slick airframe of a Lockheed Super Constellation and you will have one of the most beautiful-looking aircraft that ever graced the sky: the Lockheed EC-121 Airborne Radar System. Between the early years of the 1950s thru the mid 1960s, the 121 guarded the United States coastline against a surprise enemy air incursion. It saw extensive action in Vietnam where its advanced electronic detection systems provided US force commanders with an in-depth look at the enemy’s movements, not only in the air, but also on the ground and on the seas. The 121 program had its roots at the end of the Second World War, when US military planners were facing what they thought would be an overwhelming Soviet Air Force superiority and they would need as much warning as possible to deploy their air and naval assets. Following the normal development path, the 121 entered full production mode in the early 1950s. The Warning Star, as the EC-121 was officially known – its crew knew it as the “Wily Victor” – first entered front line service with the US Navy in October 1955.

The Warning Star was designed for long and taxing patrols, thus the aircraft retained all the comforts of the airliner on which it was based. The flight deck was roomier than previous military planes, a feature well appreciated by its crew. The pilot and copilot were seated in the front of the aircraft’s cockpit; the flight engineer was seated directly behind them. The radio operator and flight navigator were seated at the end of the cockpit structure. Two rows in the middle of the fuselage were used to house 28 electronic operators who collected and directed information received from the Star’s radar arrays. One of the main reasons Lockheed selected the Constellation airframe to incorporate the most advance airborne radar system designed, was the need to locate the radome on the underside of the airframe. The Constellation had the required ground clearance because of its long undercarriage. The rear part of the aircraft was used to provide the crew with a comfort station. Four bunks and a primitive toilet were placed in the tail end of the 121. A small kitchenette was also installed there. Propelling the aircraft were four 2535-Kw Wright R3350-34 radial piston engines capable of generating 3,400 hp. The 121 could stay airborne for up to thirty five hours without refueling.

Four squadrons of the Warning Star were formed in the mid 1950s. Operating from bases in Scotland and Iceland, Warning Stars performed around-the-clock air patrols over the North Atlantic. They also operated from US Navy bases in Puerto Rico and Cuba. They saw combat action in the sky over Vietnam, offering assistance and relaying electronic information to US aircraft operating in the area. Only one EC-121 was lost during a combat operation. One 121 was shot down near North Korean territorial waters in 1969. The aircraft was lost along with its complementary crew. In the early 1970s, the US Air Force and Navy replaced its respective fleets of EC-121 Warning Stars with the first truly AWACS system platform: Boeing’s E-3. Today we can still see some Warning Stars gracing the skies above the US. All remaining 121s are privately owned and are flown at air shows all across America.

- Raul Colon

More information:
wikipedia: EC-121 Warning Star

Latest Russian Air Force Bomber
Developments

The end of the Cold War and the new financial realities within the Russian Federation in the early 1990s, accelerated the decommissioning, and eventual termination of large portions of the former Soviet Union’s Strategic Bomber Force on-going development programs. In addition to these cutbacks, new aircraft development programs have been dramatically cutback and the aircraft industry itself no longer reflects the one that dominated Soviet society from the late 1940s onward. Nevertheless, studies into future bomber developments have continued, although relatively little information has so far, been made available to the general public regarding Russia’s newest bomber designs. The following is a partial view of some of the work that the Soviet Union undertook since the early 1980s. But, as with all related aircraft design information, it’s difficult to verify if any of these programs are still active today. In the early 1990s, the Mikoyan Bureau commenced a research study into a hypersonic, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, which may also have being given the designation of bomber. The Mikoyan 301, as the type was designated, could had flown at speeds of over Mach 3.5 utilizing special hybrid power plant that would operate in flight as a ram jet engine. To cope with the built up of heat friction, the 301 was designed to be built completely out of an new stainless steel alloy. The aircraft’s concept design was able to take-off with a maximum weight of 176,367lb. A variable geometry wing was to be employed in the design. By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of a new century, work on this spectacular design probably would had been shelved or at best, moving on a much slower pace than original conceived by Soviet, and then Russian authorities.

The next generation Russian bomber could very well have been the incredible Sukhoi T-60S. Few, if any, detail have surfaced of this design. What it is known is that the T-60S was conceived as a supersonic, stealth heavy bomber. Re-heat wouldn’t have been fitted to the aircraft, as the plane was supposedly able to supersonically cruise at high altitude on dry power, and its weapon system platform would have included cruise missiles, second generation precision guided conventional munitions and free-fall nuclear weapons. Some have speculated that this aircraft in fact entered full scale development in early 1990, but the subsequence collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, prevented any additional work on the project. In the summer of 1998 it was widely reported that the project was still ongoing as a possible replacement for the Tu-16 and Tu-22M bombers.

From the early 1980s onward, the Tupolev Design Bureau began to look for a potential successor to its successful Tu-160 bomber platform. The end result of these studies produced a pair of hypersonic aircraft projects. The first, designated Aircraft 260, was, from 1983 forward, intended to fly at Mach 4 at an operational ceiling of 83,000 ft and was to have an un-refuelled range of 6,215 miles. This aircraft was proposed to be powered by four Soloviev D80 jet engines mounted in a side-by-side configuration beneath a double delta wing configuration. The aircraft would have had a relatively flat main fuselage. There was to be no tail-plane on this new bomber, just a single tall fin. Its fully-loaded take off weight was around 396,825lb. A preliminary design project was completed by the fall of 1985. The next hypersonic plane design to surface in relation with Tupolev’s future design program was Aircraft 360. It had a similar layout to the 260 project, but was bigger and supposedly capable of speeds in excess of Mach 6 with an un-refuelled range of 9,323 miles. It could carry a massive bomb load of 22,046lb. Aerodynamics studies suggested that with a constant cruise speed of Mach 6, the aircraft would lose about three thousand miles in operational range. To obtain this incredible speed, the installed engines would need to utilize cryogenic fuel cells and, as a result, six hydrogen-powered units were intended to be fitted; all of them “variable cycle” types that could operated in both a turbojet and ramjet environment. There were to be two crewmen and the aircraft bomb load was to be carried in two wing root bomb bays. The design development program also envisioned the flight testing of a scale model plane weighting around 176,367lb, but the project was terminated in the fall of 1992 after some fuselage and fuel system parts had already been manufactured. Again, the program termination was in great part due to the strained financial situation in Russia

It’s also believed that Tupolev’s designers began work on a subsonic flying wing bomber concept as early as the mid 1980s, designated Aircraft 202, and with research still ongoing during the late 1990s, it was hoped by the design team that a version of this aircraft might actually reach hardware development status in the early 2000s. The aircraft was given a temporary designation of B-90, which stood for Bomber of the 1990s and the project was visualized as an intercontinental strike heavy bomber aircraft replacement for the aging Tu-95M Bear bomber fleet. But as with many of these exceptional designs, financing was a major problem and the project was cancelled in the early 2000s.

- Raul Colon

References:

1. Aircraft of OKB Tupolev, Vladimir Rigmant, Moscow Russavia 2001
2. Soviet X-Planes, Yefim Gordon & Bill Gunston, Midland Publishing 2000
3. Russian Aviation and Air Power in the Twentieth Century, Edit Robin Higman, John T. Greenwood & Von Hardesty, Frank Cass 1998

The Current State of the
Cuban Armed Forces

Once upon a time, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, was the single most powerful military force in Latin America and one of the most technically advanced forces in the Third World. Equipped with Soviet-provided military hardware and following Soviet military doctrines, the FAR transformed itself from a mainly defense apparatus into an expeditionary type-force of 200,000 men strong. This transformation, which started in the early 1960s and was the direct product of massive Soviet military subsidies, was complete by the mid 1970s, when Cuba sent an Expeditionary Force to the African country of Angola. There, the FAR cut its teeth in a ferocious combat with Angola’s irregular forces and with South Africa’s Defense Forces. The combat experience gained on the African continent, the sheer number of troops available for combat, and the influx of new Soviet-supplied hardware in the early 1980s enabled the FAR to field a formidable deployable force. A force capable of dominating any Caribbean base force except the United States. By the 1980s the Cold War was entering a new phase. Changes were coming and new players were entering the arena, a newly inaugurated President at the White House, a newly selected Premier at the Soviet Kremlin, and the forces of free market trade and international exchanges were reshaping the political and military landscape. Then, in 1989, almost overnight, the Soviet satellite bloc began to crumble. With the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, the Soviet Union cut nearly all military assistance to Cuba in the spring of 1989. Without these subsidies, the Cuban Revolutionary Government was not in a position to continue maintaining its force level. Major cuts were made to the force structure in the fall of 1989. The FAR, which at its peak was 210,000 men strong, was reduced by fifty percent. Today, the FAR force structure is estimated to be between 40,000 to 60,000 men in active duty, diluted between its various military branches. This current force level is compatible, per capita, with what other Latin American countries have fielded, such as Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia.

Cuban military doctrine still dictates that its major adversary must be the United States. The small size of the country and its closed-cycle economic system, made imperative that the national defense be made into a national movement, such as it is in Israel to some extent. The principal assignment given to FAR forces as assigned by the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, currently headed by interim President Raul Castro, is the defense of the national territorial integrity of Cuba; a far cry from the days when Cuba could concentrate its armed forces on exporting revolutionary ideas to other continents. Economic support for the country, as well as civilian assistance tasks have become another main mission of the FAR. The Cuban Army has increased in the last decade its level of economic and social engagements with the civilian population. Construction, manufacturing, health, and transportation services are taking more time and resources out of the FAR, thus diminishing their conventional capabilities. The Cuban Army active duty force strength is estimated at 35,000 men, most of them conscripts, serving terms of two years. Cuba’s tactical reserve forces are in the 39,000 range, also consisting of mainly conscripts. They serve for a period of forty-five days per year. Added to this total, is the Territorial Militia, a civilian reserve force of nearly one million, consisting mostly of youths and older civil servants. The FAR today is mainly an armor and artillery force. FAR possesses four to five elite armed brigades as the backbone of its structure. These forces are assisted by nine mechanized infantry brigades with one artillery, one armored, three mechanized infantry, and one air defense artillery regiment in support. The complete force readiness level is low due to reduced training. The FAR mainstay platform is the battle tank. Current reports of Cuba’s main battle tank strength puts it at 900 units, distributed between T-34s, T-54s and 55s, and T-62s; all Soviet made and currently obsolete by Western standards. The FAR possesses a limited number of the PT-76 light tanks as well as some BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles. The FAR forces relies on the venerable BTR-40, 50, 60, and 152s; as its main personnel carrier. Estimates put the BTR strength at 700 vehicles. The Cuban Army possesses one of the largest inventories of artillery systems. Towed artillery systems in FAR’s arsenal are estimated at 500 units divided between the ZIS-3 76mm, the M1938 122mm, the D-30 130mm, and the M-1937 152mm. They also posses a small number of self-propelled artillery, around forty 122mm 2S1 and 152mm 2S3. Reportedly, the FAR also possesses 150 to 175 multiple rocket launcher system, mainly the BM-21 122mm. The number of M-41 88mm and the M-38/43 120mm mortars are estimated to be at one thousand. The FAR also have a small quantity of AT-1 Snapper and AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile systems available to them. The Air Defense Forces of the FAR is equipped with 400 anti-aircraft artillery pieces, the backbone being the 23mm ZU-23 and the 30mm M-53 guns. They have a total inventory of nearly 300 surface-to-air missile platforms which includes the SA-6,7,8,9,13,14, and 16. An estimated 75% of the FAR military equipment is in storage. Economic problems have led to the cannibalization of equipment to support the active duty forces and to cover shortages in spare parts as well as a sharp decline in training, thus reducing the readiness and operational capability of the force. The FAR is no longer capable of mounting an effective operation beyond battalion level.

The Cuban Navy, as with the Army, was once one of the most feared forces in the Caribbean and Central America area of operation. The size of the forces have been steadily reduced in the past years, from 5,000 men in 1999 to around 3,000 today, plus 550 Navy Infantry Troops. Its vessel inventory consists of one Pauk II fast Patrol Craft equipped with one 76mm gun, four anti-submarine torpedo tubes and two anti-submarine weapon rocket launchers. It also possesses four Osa II missile boats to go along with 6 mine sweeper boats. There is also a smaller number of coastal boats as well as one intelligence collection vessel. For the first time since the 1960s, the Cuban Navy did not operate a submersible vessel. Coastal defenses comprised 122mm and 130mm artillery pieces and two SS-C3 systems. The reductions in personnel, equipment and training have left the Navy with no offensive capabilities. It can not operate outside its territorial waters and should be no deterrence against any foe. The most it can hope to accomplish in case of an emergency is to harass undefended civilian vessels. This is the same stage that the Cuban Air Force finds itself. Reduction in both manpower and equipment, the latter due to the lack of resources to maintain the aircraft air-operational have left the Air Force a shell of its former self. The service is staffed by 8,000 men and it operates an air inventory of 130+ aircraft. Of them, only 20 to 25 are operational. The backbone of the forces are the obsolete MiG-21 and 21F, supplemented by the MiG-23MF and around six MiG-29. Its helicopter fleet consists of 44 to 46 Mi-8/-17, plus 5 Mi-14 helicopter gun ships; its transport force of 8 An-2′s, 1 An-24, 15 An-26′s, 1 An-30, 2 An-32′s, 4 Yak-40′s and, 2 IL-76′s are mainly used for civilian transportation. The air-to-air missile inventory is believed to consist of AA 2, 7, 8, 10, and 11. Their air defense capability surrounds 13 active SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missile battery sites. The majority of them center around Havana. This force is incapable of defending Cuban national airspace against an enemy with high performance military aircraft at its disposal. Because pilot training had been cut short and a lack of significant flying time by the Cuban pilots, Cuba would have to rely heavily on its network of surface-to-air missile systems to respond to any attacking force.

The intelligence gathering capability is the only area that has not seen a marked decline in effectiveness. Cuba’s main intelligence collection efforts are still directed at the United States. Over the past years, it had shared the collected data with many nations; Cuba also had entered an agreement with the Russian Federation to maintain the old Soviet Union signal intelligence facilities at Torrens

At present time, Cuba does not possess the military capability to shift the balance of power in the Caribbean region. Cuba’s Armed Forces have been degraded to the point where they would be hard pressed to save guard its territorial integrity against many of the Latin America’s militaries. If the current attrition and degradation rate continued, in the next five years, the FAR would be no more than a para-military force equipped with obsolete weapons systems to achieve its current military doctrine.

- Raul Colon

References:

1 International Institute For Strategic Studies, 2003, 2005
2 The Military Balance, 2003 – 2004
3 The Cuban Treat to U.S. National Security, 1997, 2000 and 2005
4 Analysis of the Cuban Land and Air Forces, Redmunt 2006

Could the Red Air Force do Tactical?
The Germans certainly did not believe it

It’s a commonly known fact. The mighty Luftwaffe was far superior to the Soviet Union’s Red Air Force at the start of the Second World War. The German Air Force, the Luftwaffe, possessed a clear advantage over the Soviets in material and training, and for a brief moment; was superior to the Red Air Force in aircraft inventory. At the time of Operation Barbarossa, one of the biggest military gambles of all time, the Red Air Force was behind the Germans in aircraft design and development, as well in the number of air worthy aircraft. The Soviets did catch-up and eventually surpassed the Luftwaffe in the number of available planes, but not even this fact could change the outcome of the battle in the air. When the Germans initially started planning their surprise invasion of the Soviet Union, they carefully considered the ability of the Red Air Force to interfere or even deny Germany air control over the battlefield – a must for the German high-octane ground forces. After studying a mass of intelligence papers and reports, the German High Command felt strongly that the Soviets would only be able to muster limited tactical operations, if any. The Red Air Force’s main asset, the sheer number of fighters, most of them obsolete by 1940, was to be employed in a vain defense of the Motherland. All thru the war, the Soviets were not able to change the reality of warfare on the ground with its Air Force. Not even the introduction of new aircraft and tactics could changed it.

In the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, the German ground armies seldom saw any Soviet aircraft above their heads. When they did, it was an occasional reconnaissance aircraft or a lone bomber on a desperate mission. The only fighters that were deployed by the Red Air Force close to the German lines were the venerable I-16 fighters. They were no match for the advanced German fighters and they quickly were shot down by the Germans. Their pilots, parachuting into new German lines, were, for the most part sobbing at the idea of being a prisoner of the “savage” Germans, as the Red propaganda had led them to believe. They became more confused when the Germans treated them in a somewhat friendly manner, by their standards. The same fate awaited the bombers that followed. Deprived of any significant fighter escorts, their single-line formations were decimated by German ground fire. If any Red bomber managed to pass thru the anti-aircraft fire, the German fighters were waiting to take care of them. This happened repeatedly during the early stages of the war in the East. At this moment, a Soviet bomber attack meant nothing more to the German ground troops than an exciting spectacle, which always ended in tragedy for the Russians. Day after day, the Soviets sent their bombers in formation, and day after day, the majority did not come back home. Aircraft that managed to return to their bases were the ones that had jettisoned its bomb load and promptly turned around at the first sight of a German fighter formation. The Soviets were destined to loose all of their available aircraft if they continued with this unproductive practice. Although the Russians were able to replace all of the aircraft lost, it never recovered from the shock effect of the German fighters pounding their formations. The German superiority on fighter design was to last until the end of the war. The Soviets tried new tactics as the Germans inched closer to the heartland of the country. Soviet bombers and fighters started bombing bridges, strafing armor columns and German troop concentration areas, but this tactic did little to slow the German progress. The Germans crossed every bridge and the Soviets planes were overwhelmed by the fighter tactics of the Luftwaffe.

Another problem for the Red Air Force was the lack of coordination between the branches of the military. The Army would plan an operation but they would not inform the Air Force of it in time, or vice-versa. Planned, joint operations did manage to move forward, but with little success. The art of cooperation, introduction of new tactics and integration are a presupposed measure of personal initiative, a faculty that the Russians did not seem to posses because it ran counter to its national character. The Soviets missed many opportunities to employ airpower in order to achieve a decisive victory. A major aircraft concentration outside Moscow in the winter of 1941 would have had devastating effects on the retreating German troops, but no effort was put forward by Soviet air force officers. But when Soviet air assets were deployed, as in the Battle of Kursk during the summer of 1943, they achieved a success against the Germans. Unfortunately for the Soviets, by now all they could accomplish with tactical air power was to delay, rather than halt, the German withdrawal. The Red Air Force did not manage to destroy the majority of bridges in the area. This is the War’s second stage for the Red Air Force; they would attack in full-force, but would mainly concentrate on destroying armor, not trying to prevent the enemy from escaping. This second act would follow the Red Air Force all the way to Berlin. Time and time again, such as in Vitebsk in 1944 and East Prussia in 1945, they could have inflicted a more damaging blow, but they fizzled out after a couple of days of fighting. Another factor that hampered the Soviet air effort was their insistence on a bombing level of 7,000ft or higher. This had the effect of denying a clear sighting lane for bombers. Many of their bombs missed their targets, thus making it imperative that they go back at that target, providing the Germans with an incoming direction. These raids tended to be made by single formations. The Russians did not employ any large scale bombing formations during the war. Carpet bombing was also not employed by the Soviets. When they tried to do saturation bombing, they usually missed the Germans altogether, sometimes they even hit their own ground troops.

Night bombing attacks were the stamp of nuisance raids. In nearly all instances they were flown by a single plane and directed at targets located close to the front lines. They were annoying to the Germans but seldom caused major damage. Major night attacks, such as the bombing of Tilsit in East Prussia, were performed by single-line formations of bombers. At this rate, it took the Red bombers seven full days to destroy most of Tilsit. By the second night, the residences, knowing what’s coming, had left the city. After a major night bombing mission, some of the returning bomber crews would become disoriented and would land on German airfields thinking it was an airfield in Russian hands. Faulty maps, no clear electronic finder systems and outdated intelligence, contributed to the Soviet disastrous air effort during the last years of the war. It was the sheer mass of aircraft they had available and the fact that the Germans were sustaining massive losses on other fronts, which helped the Soviet Air Force clear the skies of German fighters on the Eastern Front in 1945. But in all critical tactical areas: aircraft design, tactics, training, integration and operational concepts, the Luftwaffe was vastly superior; all the way to the end of the war. So, yes, the Germans were right, the Soviets could not do tactical.

- Raul Colon

References:

1. Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, Donald L. Caldwell, Random House
2. Heroes of WW II, Edward Murphy, Random House
3. Fighting in Hell…, Edt Peter G. Tsouras, Presidio Press Book