Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System

The Aegis Ballistic Missile System (BMDS) is an integrated, advance radar and missile defense system employed by the United States Armed Forces and operated by the US Navy. The systems had its roots in the mid 1960s, when advances in anti-shipping missile platforms began to emerge as the most serious threat facing the world’s most powerful navy. In order to counter the threat these new system might present, the Navy issue a requirement seeking to implement an Advance Surface Missile System (ASMS). As the system began to develop, the Navy changed its designation to that of AEGIS. Such was the sophistication of the AEGIS missile system that the Navy needed to develop a new platform for its implementation. In 1977, the Navy issued an order to develop such platform in the form of a new cruiser.

The first AEGIS-carrying platform was based around the hull of a Spruance Class destroyer. Original designated as a guided missile destroyer, the newly refitted DDG47 was re-organized into a guided missile cruiser. The lead boat of this class was the USS Ticonderoga (CG47). She was commissioned in January 1983 as part of President Ronald Reagan’s massive military build-up of the early 1980s. The game changed when the USS Bunker Hill (CG52) came online, its commissioning ushered a new era in surface weapon platforms. The ‘Hill was the first US ship to deploy a fully operational Vertical Launching System (VLS) designed to counter any airborne threat. As more AEGIS-carrying ships were launched, the system evolved from a purely theater-based system to a larger defensive mechanism capable of supporting large expanse of, not only sea, but land areas. It is this system that is currently the backbone of the United States BMDS platform.

Today, the US deploys three AEGIS capable cruisers and seven destroyers. All fitted with the vaunted SM-3 missile system. The SM-3 is the current incarnation of the SM-2 block IV system. The SM-3 used the same booster and dual thrust rocket system as the SM-2 for the first and second rocket stages. It also used basically the same steering control package and missile guidance system for trans-atmospheric operation. To support the new exo-atmospheric interception profile, the SM-3 used a new third rocket stage for additional thrust. The SM-3 employs a dual-pulse rocket system for exo-atmospheric operation and a Lightweight Exo-atmospheric Projectile with a Kinetic Warhead for the missile’s interception phase. The interception missile received its data from sensors in space and others elements in the BMDS network. The complete system is designed to be autonomous after its launch. The SM-3 can detect, track and engage any ballistic missile threat in its assigned area of operation. The SM-3 Kinetic Warhead does not posses a high explosive fuse, instead, the warhead relies on its kinetic energy released during the missile’s impact with its designated target. The complete energy release is estimated to be above 125 mega joules.

One of the missile system’s backbones is its advance computer soft and hardware integrated system. Raytheon software architecture is design in such way that the overall capability of the system is expanding at the same rate its projected targets threats are perceived to do.

The AEGIS BDM serves the US Armed Forces as its most forward deployed sensors extending the military’s overall battlefield vision. It also provides commanders with a forward tracking and targeting platform for the defense of the United States, Alaska and Hawaii. As the system continues to grow, the integration of the AEGIS with the overall BDM capability of the US Armed Forces will continue. As of today, the AEGIS missile system had provided twelve successful interceptions out of fourteen attempts. These attempts were performed against short-to-medium rage ballistic missiles utilizing a unitary or separating warhead. It’s expected that by the end of the winter of 2008, all 18 ships of the AEGIS class would be fitted with the most advance computer architecture available. The system next evolutionary step will be taken on 2009 and 2010, when its overall capability will be upgraded once more in order to cover a difference defense spectrum, the target’s thermal phase. This upgrade will also provide the SM-3 with a mid-course discrimination tracking, guiding and engagement mechanism that would allow this theater program to engage long range ballistic missiles.

As the AEGIS operates as integrated part of the BMDS platform, its overall capability upgrade will provide the system to coordinate short, medium and even long range missile threats engagements in both, thermal and mid-course stages.

- Raul Colon

More information:
wikipedia: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System
AEGIS Combat System
RIM-161 SM-3

Air Effort over Gallipoli: A Brief Look at the Air Campaign over the Dardanelles

On March 1915, with the cloud of an impending invasion in the Dardanelles sector by the Western Allies looming over the Ottoman Empire, the Turks began preparations to repel the invading force. An Army Group was created for the sole purpose of opposing, and eventually, repelling the expected Allied invasion force. On March 25th, 1915 the Turkish 5th Army was formed, it was to be lead by the head of Germany’s military mission in Turkey, Field General der Kavalleri Otto Limon von Sanders. The field headquarters’ for 5th Army was placed in the small town of Gallipoli. At the time of its conception, 5th Army did not possess any air assets in its inventory. Despite constants pleads by their leaders, no aircraft was a tolled to the 5th until mid July 1915. At the time, military aviation was not completely comprehended by either Turkish leader. They failed to fully embrace the promise the aircraft could deliver on the battlefield. As a result, initial requirement for an air component to 5th Army was rather sluggish.

When the land war officially commenced on the Dardanelles Strait in April 25th, 1915 with the landing of British and French forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Ottoman air situation was precarious at best. At the time of the landing, the 5th possessed only three Albatross B.I and one Rumpler B.I aircraft. The Albatross B.I was a reconnaissance aircraft that first enter front-line service in the late 1913. The B.I was one of the first aircraft to be built with the setting of the pilot and observer in a tandem configuration (side-by-side). The idea behind such a radical design was to provide the observer with the same observation environment as the pilot. The fuselage was 28′ 1″ in length with a height of 11′ 6″. The wingspan was 46′ 11″ and the complete wing of the Albatross B.I compromise an impressive 46′ 11″. Its power plant was one Mercedes DI engine capable of generating up to 100hp. The DI provided the Albatross with top speeds of only 60mph. The B.I climb rate was estimated at 200′ per minute. Maximum take-off weight was 1,800lbs and the B.I had an operational range of 400 miles. On the other hand, the Rumpler B.I was one of the first of what Germany called battleship planes. The Rumpler B.I used by the Ottomans over Gallipoli was a Type 4A platform with a length in fuselage of 27′ 6″ and a height of 10′ 1″. Its wingspan covered an area of 42′ 6″. The Rumpler was powered by a Mercedes DI-Krei engine capable of providing the aircraft with 104hp; this power propelled the Rumpler at speeds of around 75-79mph. As it was the case with the Albatross, the Rumpler was manned by a crew of two, but instead of being sited side-by-side, in the Rumpler the pilot sat in the rear of the main fuselage with the observer right behind the main propeller mechanism. The Rumpler initially took to the skies in the summer of 1914 and promptly when on to establish many endurance records for the Imperial German Army. All of these aircraft samples were provided by Germany in an attempt o booster Turkish resolve and moral on the eve of the invasion.

By March 18th, the Allies had assembled an impressive battle fleet near the entrance of the Bozcaada Harbor. There were no less than twelfth battleships, three to four battle cruisers, a small number of repair ships, probably two; and twenty one destroyers and submarines. They were lead into the harbor by a small flotilla of ten fishing boats. Their sole mission was to sweep the harbor of unexploded mines. There, on the morning of the 18th, was where the first air mission of the campaign by the Ottomans took place. The sole Rumpler sample in possession of the Turks took to the air from a recently completed airfield located almost 3km behind the Straits, on a reconnaissance mission to scan the harbor and to monitor the movements of the massive Allied armada. What the German pilots on the Rumpler reported back to their Turkish leaders was to fright them. The Allies were poised to pass thru the Dardanelles at full speed with a much larger fleet than early was estimated. Official Turkish records showed that the combine British and French naval force on the Strait compromised of fourteen front line battleships, four heavy cruisers, two repair ships, two hospital vessels and other minor vessels such as destroyers and submarines (twenty one in all). After the report was made public to top Turkish Army commanders, the full alarm was sounded at 3:35pm on the afternoon of the 18th.

Before the Allies decided to launch their major naval offensive, scouts planes were send out looking for the locations of mines in the Straits. At that time, standard sea mines were located at depth of 26′-3″. They could be easy recognized from altitudes up to 3,280′. Unfortunately for the Allies, during their aircraft recon missions, there were prevailing heavy seas in the operational area. Thus, the aircrews reported back to their home ships that the area appeared to be mine-clear, a tragic mistake that would lead to a massive loss of life in the upcoming hours. The Irresistible, Bouvet, and Ocean were sunk immediately after contact with mines, while the Inflexible, Suffren and Gaulois were heavily damaged. The ships that made thru began a massive naval artillery barrage over Turkish costal defenses. The relative short range of the Ottoman’s costal batteries meant that the Allied barrages were almost uncontested. At around 4:00pm, the Turks launched another scout mission over the Straits. A second sortie, by the Rumpler, took part two and half hours later. Both of these missions were intended to locate Allied ships west of Limni. During the first fly, it was observed that the Allied armada stationed there was commencing retreating maneuvers from that specific area of operations, a fact confirmed by the second patrol aircraft. The next four days saw a grounding of the Turkish aircraft due to bad weather. Activity picked up in the morning hours of the 22nd, when a Turkish artillery shell hit a Royal Navy scout plane, forcing it to crash land at the Bay of Saroz. Another Turkish patrol mission was performed in the early morning hours of the 26th, again to Limni, and again the scout plane reported the Allied pullout of the area. On this same day, the Turkish air forces on the Gallipoli area received two additional B1. Albatross courtesy of the German government.

While the Ottoman’s crude air arm was primarily use as a reconnaissance toll, it provided to the Turks valuable information in regards to the whereabouts of the Allied armada, the French and British air effort was more offensive in its profile. At the beginning of hostilities in Gallipoli, the French stationed a squadron or Escadrille consisting of eight Farman HF.20 aircraft stationed at Bozcaada. The HF.20 was a remarkable simple aircraft to operate and maintain but was terrible under powered. They were design and manufactured by Henri Farman. The HF.20 had a wooden fuselage of 28′-9″ in length with a height of 10′-0″. The wing structure, covered with canvas as was the practice on those days, encompassed 51′-0″. The aircraft was propelled to the air by a Gnome 7A 7 cylinder, air cooled rotary engine capable of generating 80hp. With this engine, the HF.20 reached speeds up to 65mph. Service ceiling was a pedestrian 9,000′. But while the aircraft lacked enough speed to operate against the newest German pursuit planes, the HF.20 had the ability to be airborne for 3hrs and 20mins, and important trait in their mission profile which was primarily scouting duties. In case an enemy aircraft got to close, the 20 was armed with a rudimentary 0.30in machine gun. The plane was operated by a crew of two and its maximum take-off weight was 1,565lb.

The allies were more flexible than the Turks in the use of aircraft. While Turkish commanders halted air operations in case of rain or extensive clouds, Allied aircraft took-off for operations on the same environment. The Allies also were more incline to let its aircraft wander longer distances that their adversaries. Thus enhancing their reconnaissance field area. In addition to these differences, the Allies were more receptive to the use of new technology, especially aerial cameras. Those factors tilted the air campaign in favor of the much prepared French and British pilots. At the beginning of the Expedition, the Allied main aircraft was the Sopwith Tabloid seaplane. The Tabloid was built to compete in the seaplane races spurring all around the British Isles on those days. The Tabloid airframe height was 10′-0″ with a length of 23′-0″. The biplane wingspan covered an area of 25′-6″. A single Gnome Monosoupape 9 cylinder rotary engine capable of producing 100hp was the planes power plant. This engine gave the Tabloid a maximum speed capability of 92mph. Operational range was 315 miles while its top ceiling was 15,000′. The aircraft was manned by only one individual and fully loaded weight it at 1,580lbs. Early versions of the Tabloid were unarmed, but as the type was require entering service, a 0.303″ Lewis machine gun was fitted on it. The Sopwith were ferry to the Gallipoli area by the newest acquisition of the Royal Navy, HMS Ark Royal. The world’s first true aircraft carrier. Beside the Ark Royal, the cruisers Dories and Minerva, as well as the seaplane tenders Hector (a converted balloon tender) and Manica; operated the Tabloid in the area. Seaplane operations were still in its infancies and many accidents were reported in handling these seaplanes, most of them occurred while the plane was lowered to the sea or retrieved from it. The first Tabloids, a contingent of four, were ferry to Bozcaada aboard the Ark Royal in the early days of February. After a brief period in the area, the Ark Royal headed back to the Mediterranean Sea because of the ship captain’s fear of a German U-boat attack.

As the land battle intensifies, the air component was just staring. As stated before, in those early days of the Gallipoli campaign, both side utilized the aircraft as means to gather information on the enemy’s position and possible movements. But as the battles moved forward, the aircraft evolved with it. As early as April 29th, German pilots were dropping hand-held bombs on British positions inland. Although they caused minor, if any, damage, the effect on the troops fighting on the ground was profound. Another Turkish coup occurred when an Albatross flew over HMS Euryalus and drooped three grenade-type bombs. All of them missed the cruiser, but the aircraft was able to relay the location of the ship to its headquarters. Within a few hours, Turkish costal guns were zeroing on the Euryalus. As the land battle grew, the air effort did the same. During much of May and June, both sides tried, unsuccessful, to use the aircraft as a stable bombing platform against their opponent troop concentrations. The situation on the ground was beginning to turn against the invading allies. In late June, the Turks stopped an Allied advance up to the peninsula. The situation on the air also appeared to be in favor of the Ottomans. On July 5th, they received from Germany, the first two samples of the vaunted Gotha Airplane. The aircraft were assigned to Canakkale Fortress Command instead of the Turkish 5th Army Command. The 5th retained the small number of Rumpler and Albatross already assigned to them by Istanbul officials. The arrival of the Gotha created a sense of victory in the part of the Turks and anxiety in the part of the French and British. The Gotha was truly a remarkable piece of hardware. It ranks among the best aircraft ever developed. This group was named the German Navy Special Detachment Naval Aircraft Group. The group’s first commander was Lieutenant Ludwing Preussner, he was soon replaced by Captain Tahsin. On July 13th, the group was reinforced by four new aircraft.

Meanwhile on the ground, both the allies and the Turks and Germans were preparing for the next phase of the campaign. The allied intention now was the cutting off the link between Istanbul and the Ottoman Army. To achieve this, on the late hours of August 6th, the allies landed at Anafartalar and on the northern part of Ariburn. To assist the allied invasion, four Bristol, six B.E. 2cs, and six Morane aircraft joined the 2nd R.N.A.S. squadron. At the same time, the Turks were having air problems. The main situation for them was the allocation of their planes. The Ottomans planned to solve the problem by transferring all air assets from the Germans to the Turks. New German planes will come directly to Turkish formation instead of being allocated to the German military in Turkey. While the Ottoman air force’s administrative situation was being handling. The Turks ground forces faced a three front assault in the Gallipoli peninsula. The first front was at the entrance of the strait in the Rumelian area, the second was at Ariburnu and the third one was at Anafartalar. Thousand of soldiers from both sides were fighting on these narrow areas. On the morning of August 10th, the Anafartalar Front Group, commanded by the famous Mustafa Kemal, opened one of the bloodiest battles in the whole Great War. The ground effort was joined by Fliegerabteilung 1 squadron, which also continued to give close air support to the 5th Army. The squadron, which was composed from a mixture of German and Turkish pilots, made on September 18th, one of the most astonish discoveries of the campaign. The squadron commander, Captain Korner, reported on that morning that he saw for the first time a decrease in the number of enemy forces at Gallipoli.

On the European Continent, the session of quick German victories on the Easter Front pushed Bulgaria to join the Central Power in September 1916. With Bulgaria in their pocket, and the collapse of the Serb resistance a month later, the Germans were now able to re-supply the Ottomans with aircraft, parts and ammunition from the vast railroad system now available to them. A fact not lost on the Allied high command. As the flow of aircraft began to increase, so did the Turks air force capabilities. By late September, the Ottomans had setup another seaplane base near Canakkale. From there, the five assigned Gothas WD2 seaplanes began to harass the allied-held airfields of Imbros and Teredos.

By August 10th, the allies knew the situation on the peninsula had deteriorated to a point that they could not sustain reliable combat operations on the Conkbayiri line. On the other front, Anafartalar, the allies attacked once more on the morning of August 13th, but the assault was turned back with relative ease. By the 17th, the third and last great battle for Anafartalar was over. Despite the fact that all the allied vessels in the area bombarded the Turkish defensive positions, the Ottomans held. As series of bloody battles continued until Lord Kitchener visited the Gallipoli beachhead on November 14th. A month later, the French and British high commands decided to abandon the campaign. Now they would retreat to the sea as fast as possible. During the retreat operation, the R.N.A.S. Number 2 squadron, augmented by kite balloons from balloon-carrying ships; gave cover to the ground and naval forces. They were able to keep the rapidly expanded Ottoman air force in check during most of the retreat. What the Turks could not do on aerial combat, they did on reconnaissance operations. Observation reports from the abandoned allied positions revealed to them the scope of their enemy’s retreat. Occasionally, Turkish seaplanes were deployed in bombing missions over the allied camps and artillery positions. In all, Turkish seaplanes dropped more than thirty three free-fall bombs hitting seventeen different targets.

When the allies finally evacuated the peninsula in January 1916, the aerial defense of the entire Dardanelles sector of operations were assigned to the newly formed Dardanelles Squadron. Meanwhile, Fliegerabteilung Number 1 remained in constant combat readiness at Galata in case the allies decided to re-assault the peninsula. A feat no invader has attempted since.

- Raul Colon

References:

Air Power, Stephen Budiansky, Penguin Group 2004
The Churchill War Papers, Martin Gilbert, Norton 1993
Air Power and War Rights, JM Spaight, Longmans 1924

The End of the Luftwaffe

The final came swiftly to the once powerful German Air Force. After nearly two years of continuing fighting in two major fronts, the Luftwaffe, once the most feared air force in the world, was reduce to a token force. The force that once dominated the skies above continental Europe was now in no position to slowdown the onslaught of Allied formations pounding the Fatherland. But although the writing could be clearly seen from the outside, it took a long time for the Luftwaffe leaders to realize their dire situation. In fact, it was not until the beginning of April 1945 that the “end of the war” was clearly seen. By this time, allied ground forces were rapidly approaching the German capital, Berlin, from the West. This quick advance by the powerful armies of the Western democracies aside taking huge chunks of German territory, it had also overrun a good size of Germany’s aircraft factories. For example, the Focke Wulf factory at Cottbus, which have just began to mass produce the Ta 152 high altitude fighter, when its was overran by the Red Army. Full production of the Ta 152, along with its “wonder weapons” counterparts, the Ba 349, He 162 and Do 335; came to a crashing halt by mid March 1945. By April 1st, Gruppen Jagdgeschwader Number 1 had received nearly all of its He 162 complement. The pilots on the outfit found the new fighter to be extremely fast and maneuverable although very unforgiving. Almost two hundred of these jet fighters were delivered to the Luftwaffe before hostilities ceased in May. The Bachem Ba 349 Natter vertical take off interceptor was another of the Luftwaffe’s wonder weapons. The platform passed the manned test flight phase without much glitch and by April 1945, units of these small planes were already deployed. The first launching fully operational Ba 349 site was located at Kircheim near Stuttgart. The aircraft never attacked the dreaded US 8th Air Force bomber formations they were designed to do from Kircheim. The Germans, fearful that their new weapon would slid into American hands, the American Army was closing the Stuttgart gap quickly, demolished the aircraft’s take off ramps. As for the other wonder weapon, the much heralded Dornier Do 335, the aircraft ran into many technical hurdles during its design phase, and although they were corrected, this twin engine fighter never entered operational service.

At the same time the Germans were abandoning air force bases, the much malign Luftwaffe was launching their last great offensive. Operation “Wehrwolf”, the planned large ramming operation against the American heavy bomber formations, took place on April 7th. A force of 120 Bf 109 and 59 Me 262s were thrown against an American air fleet of nearly 1,300 B-17 and B-24, supported by a massive fighter complement. Utilizing fewer aircraft that the operational plans called for, “Wehrwolf” was a failure. Only eight heavy bombers were lost due to the new German ramming technique, fifteen were damaged but were able to return to their departing bases. In all, the American shut down 59 German planes. There was widespread recrimination inside the Luftwaffe for the apparent failure. Evidence collected pointed to icing conditions preventing most German fighters to reach their dives positions and the fact that the Germans mounted an operation this complex without the requirement complements of aircraft. Whatever was the reason for the failure, the fact remains that after “Wehrwolf”, the Luftwaffe ceased to plan any other large scale operation due to its shortness in assets and now, time.

By the second week of April, the German forces, fighting in two fronts; only controlled two separate enclaves in the country, the Bavaria sector in the south and the area around Schleswig-Holstein in the north. In recognition of this development, the Luftwaffe command was restructured once more. The still operational units in the north of Germany, East Prussia, Denmark, Norway and Courland were placed under the command of Luftflotte Reich under General Stumpff. The units on the south of Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and northern Italy were placed under Luftflotte 6 under the overall command of General von Greim. On the ground, by April 16th, Soviet spearheads were crossing the Rivers Oder and Neisse and began to establish beachheads on the other side. The German formations on the rivers’ banks, outnumbered two to one in manpower and four to one in equipment, fought valiantly and initially they hold them back. That afternoon, every Luftwaffe unit available for combat operation was thrown into the desperate battle. The attack action that took place by the gallant Luftwaffe pilots can only be described as desperation. In a classic kamikaze-style attack, scores of Bf 109′s pilots rammed their aircraft against Soviet tanks pouring into the new established beachhead. This was the first and only occasion that the Luftwaffe would employ this barbaric tactic in combat. No ones know the extended of the damage caused by the Luftwaffe’s kamikaze pilots. If it was significant, Soviet engineers were quickly able to replace the damaged pontoon bridges. In fact, the flow of Soviet troops and equipment continued almost unmolested by the air attack. By the late 17th, scores of Soviet bombers augmented by a massive artillery bombardment stunned the outmanned defenders. By the early hours of the 18th, the mass of the Soviet Army was preparing to cross the rivers. German defense positions along the rivers banks crumbled in the face of superior numbers and firepower.

At the same time inside Adolf Hitler’s Berlin bunker, the situation was getting to a climax. Hitler began to issue orders to many depleted Luftwaffe combat units to attack the Soviet formations at once. One order in particular stunned General Karl Koller, the Luftwaffe Chief of Staff who had been by the side of the German leader in his bunker. Hitler proposed given command of all jet fighter and bombers to Hans Ulrich Rudel, a ground attack expert who knew little about the new jet planes. Koller and other Luftwaffe officials tried to talk Hitler out of the idea. The situation deteriorated further when on the morning of April 21st Berlin was shelled by Soviet long range artillery. Hitler was furious. He demanded from Koller an explanation regarding the Luftwaffe’s absentee from the fight during that morning barrage. Koller tries once again to tell Hitler the fact that most Luftwaffe units were depleted and the ones that remained semi operational lacked sufficient fuel and ammunition to mount an effective campaign. The Fuhrer criticized the fact that the Me 262s did not took off from their field in Prague to support the beleaguer Berlin garrison in April 22nd. Koller responded that in spite of the continually narrowing and changing the combat area, the Luftwaffe is encircle in an ever small pockets, surrounded on all side by a much stronger foe; all that is human possible to relive Berlin is being done.

By the late hours of the 22nd, Hitler began to see the writing on the war. He now came to the conclusion that the war had been lost. Many of Hitler’s inner circles tried to convince the Fuhrer to leave the capital but he refused. Instead, Hitler had his secretaries bring his personal papers up to the bunker’s courtyard and burn them. The Wehrmacht wanted to take all of the troops fighting on the West and throw them in the East. Meanwhile, Reichmarschall Hermann Goering, who was first in Germany’s line of succession, began to carve out a plan to take command of the Third Reich. He seized the opportunity and, before all communication was lost with the Berlin bunker, on April 23rd he sent a cable directly to Hitler. In the now infamous telegram, Goering stated his reason for taking command of the Reich. He cited the Fuhrer’s decision to remain in Berlin despite all odds and courted Hitler’s June 29th, 1941 decree stating that if the Fuhrer is incapacitated in any form, the Reichmarschall would take over the German government as its official head. Goering even demanded that Hitler respond to the cable before 10:00PM of that day. He sent the same piece to Keitel and Ribbentrop. Before Goering’s telegram arrived, the Fuhrer had recovered his sense of purpose and began planning the capital defense. When he received the cable, Hitler went on one of his now famous tirades. He lambasted Goering calling him a traitor. Enraged by what he saw as a stab in the back from a trusted old friend, the German leader sent Goering a strongly worded cablegram forbidding the Luftwaffe leader from taking over the government. The Fuhrer sent out orders to arrest Goering at once, together with Koller and many top Luftwaffe officials. Thus, at the time of its greatest peril, the Luftwaffe was left without its top officials. After the arrest of all of the officials, Hitler released Koller the same day, the Fuhrer appointed General Robert von Greim, previously commander of the Luftflotte 6, to the post of Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe replacing Goring. As all these were happening, the disintegration of the Third Reich continued at a rapid pace. On the afternoon of the 25th, the two arms of the Red Army met west of the German capital. On the same date, Soviet and American spearheads linked up on the River Elbe at Torgau. With this linking, the only way available for the German Army to move its forces and equipment was by air. Night flights became the sole mean of transportation for the once fearful German Army.

Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe continued its desperate attacks against the Soviet columns crossing the River Oder. On the afternoon of the 27th a force of seven Mistel and three Ju 188s, joined by a force of Fw 190 fighters; attacked the Soviet Oder’s beachhead. As they approached the target area, a massive anti-aircraft barrage greeted them. It was a slaughter. In the end, only one of the seven Mistel returned along with a sole Fw 190. As these sorties were taking place there were a frantic effort to supply the beleaguer Berlin garrison. A flight of six Fieseler Storch, escorted by 30 fighters assembled at Rechlin to fly to the German capital at dusk. The operation failed miserable. Terrible weather was blamed for the failure. On the 28th, four Ju 52 left Rechlin bound for the center of Berlin. Only one Ju 52 made it through the flak-heavy encirclement. On the 29th, von Greim flew to Rechlin to plan the air aspect of the Fuhrer “massive attack” on the Soviet army in the Berlin area of operation. Unfortunately for the Fuhrer by this time the Luftwaffe had just a trickle of combat ready units available for the operation. Having changed bases so often in the past year meant that the units allocated to those bases had retired from them without its full fuel compliment as well as its ammunition allocation, thus when Hitler ordered the “massive counter attack” there were no full combat ready Luftwaffe unit available for combat. There was also a major shortness in manpower as well. As the German Army began to crumble, many Luftwaffe units were disbanded. These displaced Luftwaffe personnel went on to join the Army’s ever depleted ranks. The Army was also in peril. Its units decimated by four years of brutal combat. When the attack commenced in April 29th, it smashed itself uselessly against the powerful Soviet force ringing the capital. In Berlin itself, conditions were rapidly deteriorating. Fuel and ammunition had almost run out and the only way to re-supply the small pockets of defenders that now fought for every corner of the city was with airdrops. A prospect that now the once most powerful air force in the world could not even attempt to perform at this time. On April 30th, Hitler named Grossadmiral Karl Donitz his successor as Fuhrer of the Third Reich; he then proceeded to commit suicide.

The small size of China’s amphibious fleet excludes the Chinese of taking control of Taiwan by means of an amphibious assault. In the past, Chinese leaders had threatened to take action against Taiwan if the island, which China considered a renegade province, decided to declare its independence. The reality is that even if China decided to use force, it lacked the necessary military resources needed to complete the operation. An amphibious assault, which is the only mean China could take control of Taiwan’s territory, is out of the equation. First, China can only transport one armored division across the Straits, and even this would be hard to accomplish. Second, any amphibious landing would need complete control over the skies in the Strait, which the Chinese air force probably could not accomplish. Finally, both Taiwan and the United States could see the signs of pending military offensive months before the actual event. What China could do is to attack Taiwan with a barrage of missiles, the DF 15 and the DF 11. These missile systems are not accurate enough to destroy strategic targets such as airfields, radar stations and transport facilities; their only use would be as terror weapons, such as the V-2 or the Scud. If they are not fitted with nuclear warheads, the damage they could cause would be similar to a natural disaster. China also possesses a limited number of these missiles and any missile siege would be limited in duration. A naval blockade of the island is possible, but due to the strong U.S. statement regarding any attack on Taiwan and the notion of a powerful U.S. fleet coming to relive the besieged island, China would be hard pressed to perform any naval operation in the area.

From the moment Donitz assumed command of the German state, he worked to end the war as soon as possible. He understood the need to at least slow the Soviet advance so as much as the German civilian population could make it to areas controlled by the Western Allies. As soon as he commenced surrender negotiations with the American and British, masses of German ground, naval and air formations began to surrender in full. Almost all of the Luftwaffe forces who were able to surrender to the Western Allies were content to do so. But in the east the situation was different. Several units continued to resist the Soviets with ferocity. The units that were closer to the Allies’ lines began to journey into them with as many civilians as they could take. The end came swiftly for the Luftwaffe. An end it was destined to achieve given the nature of the war Hitler undertook.

- Raul Colon

References:

Six Months to Oblivion, Werner Girbig, Shepperton 1975
The Flying Bomb, Richard Young, Shepperton 1978
The Luftwaffe War Diaries, Cajus Bekker, London 1966

Soviet Early Maritime Patrol Aircraft:
The Beriev Bureau’s Role

The early history of the Soviet Union’s maritime patrol aircraft was centered on the once vaunted Beriev Design Bureau which was organized by the famous Georgy M. Beriev. The bureau origins dated to October 1934 when it was organized as the Central Design Bureau of Seaplanes Manufacturing. The bureau was the primary contractor for some of the Soviet Union’s Second World War seaplanes designs including the massive MDR-5 long range maritime reconnaissance platform as well as the MDR-7. Neither design made it out of the mockup stage. There were other wartime designs that, although very promising, never made it out of its conceptual stages. One that did make it was the MDR-10 flying boat. After the war, the MDR-10 program was renamed the LL-143 project. The double Ls refer to Letayushchaya Lodka or flying boats. The 143 was to be powered by two powerful Shvetsov ASh72 piston engines. Construction of the first two prototype planes commenced at Factory 477 in Krasnoyarsk in 1944. A year later, the first completed aircraft was transported to Taganrog where in September 6th 1945 it made its maiden flight. By next February, the Beriev Bureau move its design and developing operations to Taganrog. In June 1945, the bureau became the State Union Experimental Plant No. 49. Plant No. 49 became the USSR’s only research and developing facility dedicated to the design and production of flying boats. Georgy M. Beriev became the new organization’s first director that summer.

Following the advances made during the Great Patriotic War, the bureau began to modify the blueprints of the second LL-143 model. The new design featured the introduction of the advance ASh73 engines as well as a new inboard radar system. The new aircraft, now renamed the be-6, took to the air for the first time in the morning hours of June 2nd 1948. This model quickly became the standard measure of every Beriev design. The next version of the seaplane, the Be-6M was able to carry a powerful set of offensive weapon systems such as a five cannon arrangement, plus its assortment of free-fall bombs, mines and torpedoes. The Be-6, codename Madge by NATO forces, production run lasted between the years 1952 to 1957. A total 123 aircraft were delivered. The next Beriev design was a 1948′s proposal codenamed Be-10. The 10′s design was similar to the Be-6. The only appreciated difference between the two crafts was that the Be-10 would have posed a tricycle undercarriage for ground operations. The Be-10 never made it out of the blueprint stage.

As aviation began to shift from propeller-driven aircraft to the new jet engine flying machines, so did Beriev’s designs. The fist all jet Beriev design was the revolutionary R-1 platform. The bureau’s experimentation with jet engines actually commenced during the later stages of development of the Be-6 platform. In 1947, and with official authorization, Beriev designed a seaplane based on the powerful British Nene jet engine. The R-1 would have the engines mounted on the upper wing structure in order to keep the engines clear of water spray when splashdown is performed. On June 1948, the soviet Ministry of Defense (SovMin) gave the official order to proceed with the program. The program continued its progression, although at a slower pace, until June 1950 when the project was revised completely. The new design would now incorporate the Soviet-built VK-1 jet engines. The aircraft’s first mockup was completed in the summer of 1951 and the first prototype was finished by the middle of 1951. On November 22nd 1951, the R-1 commenced its first set of taxi trials. The trial revealed a new phenomenon affecting seaplanes fitted with jet engines. The Hydro-dynamic Instability Barrier Effect which made the R-1 suffered severed porpoising at nearly 80% of the take-off speed. The problem was semi-corrected (it was brought to a manageable level) with modifications to the plane’s elevator and tailplane compensation mechanism. Taxing testing resumed in April 1952 and in May 30th, it took to the air for the first time. The R-1 flew several times before an October 3rd incident when water poured into the jet engine nuzzles during an attempted take-off. Although the damage was repaired, this incident put the whole program in the spotlight. Calls were beginning to come from many quarters supporting the cancellation of the entire R-1 program. Nevertheless, the program continued and on July 18th 1953, flight testing resumed. The final R-1 test flight came on February 1956 when the only prototype was severely damage during a landing operation. The program was cancelled soon afterward. Although the program was considered a failure by high ranking Soviet officials, the program did collected valuable data related to the performance of a sea-based aircraft utilizing jet engines for propulsion, data that would find its way to others Beriev’s seaplanes.

Next for the bureau was the R-2 program, a project that did not make it out of the designing board. After the R-2 came the Be-10 program which would incorporate the data recollected on the R-1 aircraft. The 10 was first conceived as a reconnaissance/strike flying boat capable to engaging enemy vessels. The program commenced in earnest on October 8th 1953 when the commander of the Soviet Naval Aviation, Admiral of the Fleet NG Kuznetsov, supported a SovMin resolution ordering the development of a long range reconnaissance platform. From the beginning, the Be-10 was designed primarily as a major offensive flying-boat. The Be-10′s offensive arsenal was carried on a massive bomb-bay with doors on the bottom of the aircraft’s hull, behind the step. A moderate, sweepback wing structure was introduced on the new plane. The first prototype was completed by October 1955. Because of the upcoming winter conditions on the Taganrog area, the new plane was not able to perform any taxing test. The aircraft was moved to a new, more plausible testing site at Gelendzhik. The Be-10 performed its maiden flight on the afternoon of June 20th 1956. The testing phase went without a glitch and by the middle of 1958 the Soviet Navy placed an order for fifty of these huge seaplanes. The production line of the Be-10 ran between 1958 and the spring of 1961. In all, twenty seven fully equipped aircraft were delivered. When the aircraft entered service in the summer of 1959, it had the distinction of being the world’s only jet-powered operational seaplane, an honor it would enjoy for years. The Be-10 or Mallow as codenamed by NATO was finally retired from front line service in August 1963. The reason was poor structural conditioning. In fact, by mid 1963, two of the 10s crashed with heavy loss of life. The follow-on plane to the Be-10 would be the Be-10N. The 10N was designed with a much larger payload capacity in order to carry two of the new K-12BS anti-ship cruise missiles. The missiles were capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear tipped warheads. The 10N would have been able to take-off with a maximum weight of 106,920lb. Its operational range was designed to be nearly 1000 nautical miles. Nevertheless, the 10N design never made it out of the mockup stages. By August 1960, the SovMin cancelled further research into this new version of the Be-10.

The bureau next design, the Be-12 would make it out of the design table. The 12 was original conceived as a pure attack aircraft. To achieve the plane’s profile, several new additions were implemented on the design. Chief among them was the incorporation of a new, more powerful Initsiativa radar array system. The seaplane was also fitted with a detection and sighting mechanism, a powerful magnetometer, a sonobuoys system, an anti-submarine weapons array that includes the latest on Soviet torpedoes and depth charges. Work commenced on the new plane in the spring of 1958. The 12 developing stage took, from the design table to the tarmac, four full years, reflecting the program’s complexity. On the afternoon of October 18th 1960, the sole Be-12 prototype took to the air on its first flight. The aircraft performed flawlessly. The 12 was very similar, aerodynamically, to the early Be-6. The fuselage was longer and it posses a ground undercarriage for tarmac operations. The SovMin approved the full production of the Be-12 in December 1960. A total of 143 units were built by the Beriev Bureau between the spring of 1963 and the summer of 1973. The 12, NATO codename Mail, became operational with the Soviet Navy in the spring of 1964. The plane became the mainstay of the Naval Aviation anti-submarine effort from it achieved full operational status.

The success of the Be-12 did not translate on the next Beriev’s designs. In the autumn of 1962, the bureau began to conceive a design for a heavy load, long range seaplane intended sorely for anti-submarine warfare. No name was giving to this “new” project. But there were few data bits related to this so-called effort. The new design would have carried four Kuznetsov NK12-M turboprop engines, supplemented by two Lyulka AL7-PB jet engines for short take-off assistance. Although the “program” never even made it to the design table, the plane’s profile would become the cornerstone of a massive effort called Project LL-600. The LL-600 program called for the seaplane to shift its profile from a pure anti-submarine/reconnaissance platform to a bomber or even a commercial airliner profile. The project proved to be too ambitious and it was cancelled by the middle of the 1960s.

By the winter of 1963, preliminary studies were made inside the Soviet Union regarding the feasibility of developing a long range, heavy payload seaplane capable of operating equally from water and land. In fact, the studies suggested a type of Short Take-Off air platform. A huge leap in technology, but one that Beriev’s engineering team believes that it could accomplish. The Be-26, as the program was codenamed, would be fitted with sixteen RD-35-36 lift jet engines. Eight of them per side in clusters around the wing root leading and trailing edges. The 26 would also be able to refuel from surfacing submarines or air tankers, extending the aircraft’s operational range. The numbers that Beriev’s team began to put out about the 26 capability profile were impressive. The seaplane would operate at a top service ceiling of 42,651ft with a top operational range of 7,272 nautical miles. Notwithstanding these impressive figures, the Be-26 proved to be too technical challenging and the program never made it out of the drawing board.

There were two other projects worth mentioned regarding Beriev’s relationship with early Soviet seaplane development. They are the impressive A-150 design and the more practical A-40 program. The 150 would have been a massive, delta wing shaped seaplane capable of being a true multi-role seaplane. The 150 would have delivered a powerful punch. It would have been a reconnaissance platform as well as a search and rescue vessel, an anti-sub and anti-ship platform and a deep penetration bomber. Just like the Be-26, this design would have STOL capabilities. But, as with the 26, the technical implications were too high at the time, so the project was abandoned. The A-40 program was another story. In 1976 the Beriev bureau began to research the feasibility of designing a next generation anti-submarine seaplane. In 1983, Soviet Government chief Designer AK Konstantinov issued an order to Beriev to proceed, officially, with the program. The A-40 was conceived as a replacement for the now venerable Be-12 and even to replace the Ilyushin Il-38 maritime patrol aircraft. The 40 mission profile called for it to perform reconnaissance and anti-submarine and shipping operations in medium range areas. The aircraft was to be powered by two Soloviev D30KPV jet engines supplemented by two Klimov RD60Ks engines. Two of these aircraft were eventually built. The first unit took to the air on December 1986. It was revealed to the world at the Tushino Air Show in august 1989. Codenamed Mermaid by NATO officials, the A-40 began a slight transformation phase which culminated in 2002 with the delivered of the first A-42 version. The 42 is be powered by a D-27a profane engines and it had a more powerful avionics package than its predecessor.

With the delivering of the A-42, the Beriev Bureau ceased to be the more important player in now Russia’s seaplane development programs. The mantle was now in the Tupolev’s Bureau hands.

- Raul Colon

References:

Beriev Be-10 “Mallow” – Russia’s Last Flying Boat, Aleksandr Zablotskiy, International Air Power Review Vol. 8, 2003
Russian X-Planes, Alan Dawes, Key Publishing 2001
Soviet Seaplane Jet Bombers, Thomas Mueller and Jens Baganz, Aerospace Projects Review, July-August 2003

Vickers’ Amazing R.100

Blessed with the ability to operate at long range and coupled with its massive payload capacity, the vaunted airship was able to rule the skies of Europe since the early days of aviation. There were many worth mentioned airship designs in those days but one in particular raised above others: the incredible Vickers’ R.100. The R.100 had its origins in Great Britain’s need for rapid communication between the Home Islands and its vast overseas empire and colonies. It was this need that propelled the Royal Airship Works to develop two competing airship blue prints; the R.100 and its sister ship, the R.101. The 100 was the brainchild of Barnes Neville Wallis, who would later become famous for the invention of the innovating “bouncing dam bomb” of World War II fame.

Work commenced on what would become the R.100 in the summer of 1928. Wallis implemented some unusual construction techniques on this impressive airship. Some of the innovating systems implemented on the 100 included the world’s first wire mesh netting mechanism intended to keep the ship’s gas (helium) envelops from being damaged by structural friction during flight. Anchors points were placed on the very tip of the ship’s nose for the attaching of the airship to its huge mooring mast. This mooring platform made it for the loading and unloading of passengers and cargo. The massive ship possessed a three deck area. The areas were large enough that up to a hundred passengers could be easy accommodated on them. A roomy dining salon, able to sit 56 people, was added on the second deck. The airship’s canvas covered steel fuselage measured 708’6″ in length with a beam cross section of 135′. The R.100 could carry an impressive 5,199,954 cubic feet of gas. The ship was powered by six massive 670 hp Rolls Royce Condor piston aero engines. This configuration allowed the 100 to operate at a top speed of 81 miles per hours. Operational endurance was around 80 airborne hours.

The R-100 approaching a mooring mast. (image, via author)

After a thirteen months design and construction period, on the morning of December 16th, 1929, the best and last major British-made gas-filled airship took to the air on its maiden flight. After a relative short trial period, the R.100 made its first operational flight on July 29th of that year. Setting up for a cross Atlantic trip, Canada being its ultimate destination, the 100 arrived at Montreal on August 1st, making a reality the first successful transatlantic voyaged by an airship. It took the ship just under 80 hours, 78 to be specific; to reach its destination. The return trip took only 58 hours. The successful trip did little to stop the wave of passengers moving for rigid airship to the new commercial airliners. The situation was asseverated when the R.100 sister ship, the 101; crashed in France two months later with heavy loss of life. As a direct result of this disaster, the 100 was removed from active service.

The R-100 passenger's dining room. (photo, via author)

The R.100′s design proved to be so successful that its geodetic construction method was implemented in Great Britain’s main medium bomber platform; the venerable Wellington bomber.

- Raul Colon

More information:
wikipedia: R100
Airshipsonline
The R100

Canada’s Only Jetliner: The C-102

Tested for the first time in the morning hours of August 10th, 1949; just a few weeks after de Havilland’s successful test of its Comet Jetliner; the C-102 was the first and last major attempt by a Canadian company, in this case the AV Roe Canada Limited, to built a commercial jetliner. Although some airlines, especially in the United States, showed some interest, the advent of the Korean War and the urgent need to provide the Canadian Royal Air Force with CF-100 fighters, terminated the program in 1951. The C-102 was a futuristic aircraft design, one very similar to the Comet. The C-102 original program called for the construction of two prototype planes. These aircraft were designed to gather information about the handling characteristics of the 102 and its engine performance at high speed. In the end, only one operational 102 was ever manufactured. The other sample was almost completed when the program was terminated.

The only 102 produced had a fuselage of 80′-9″ in length with a height of 26′-5″. The wing span was 98′-0″ with total wing area being 1,156sq ft. Full pressurization was one of the main features of the 102. With the advantage of pressurization, the 102 could accommodate thirty to fifty passengers plus an operation crew of three. The main cabin was fitted with noise reduction materials and mechanisms in order to reduce the noise signature of the four Rolls-Royce Derwent 5/17 (3,600lb) turbojets mounted on the wing structure near the main fuselage. There were talks between Avro and the Canadian government of changing the engine configuration in favor of the newest Rolls-Royce’s AJ-65 turbojet engine, but the British government did not permitted Rolls-Royce to realize the engine system to use in a civilian aircraft. Its tail was, like many of its contemporaries, upswept. The 102′s flight deck was conventional in layout fitted with dual control systems for the pilot and co-pilot. The plane undercarriage consisted of a tricycle configuration with its main dual wheels retracting into the rear of the engine area, while the front wheel would do the same under the plane’s nose cone. The Rolls-Royce engines installed on the 102 gave the aircraft top speed of 430mph. It also provided the C-102 with the ability to climb at an impressive 1,840ft per minute. Operational service ceiling was a pleasant 37,300′. With all fuel tanks filled, the C-102 was able to operate at a range of 1,250 miles.

After a grueling series of taxi testing, the 102 was airborne for the first time in August 10th. With its maiden test, the 102 defeated Boeing’s efforts to be the first company to fly a commercial jetliner over the skies of North American, by almost three full years. The 102 possessed another claim to fame. After the cancellation, the lone operational C-102 sample was send to the U.S. for further testing before the prototype was send back to Avro for data collection on the CF-100 program. The other prototype was destroyed within a year after termination. Today only the nose cone of the 102 survives. It is in display in Canada’s National Aeronautical Collection Center. A lone remainder of an era long past.

- Raul Colon

More information:
Avroland Website
wikipedia: Avro Canada Jetliner
The Avro Canada C-102 Jetliner Page
Avro Jetliner