The Forgotten ‘London’

Only thirty one units of the Saunders Roe A.27 ‘London’ biplane flying boat were built for the Royal Air Force Costal Command (RAFCC) who operated the type from 1936 to the fall of 1941. The ‘London’ is another sample of an aircraft which was obsolete before it reached front line units.

The Saro A.27 was conceived in response of Great Britain’s Air Ministry Specification order R-24/31 that called for “a general purpose open sea patrol flying boat”. Based on Saunders’ questionable Severn A.7 model, the London was destined to become one of England’s last operational flying boats platforms.

The first flight of an A.27 took place in 1934. The unit was fitted with two powerful Bristol Pegasus II radial engines mounted on the center upper top part of the wing structure.

The first ten units delivered to the RAF were designated Mk Is and were powered by a larger set of engines, the Bristol Pegasus III. They were easy to recognize by their polygonal cowlings and two-bladed propellers. The next generation of the ‘London’, the Mk II, carried the Pegasus X engines which had a circular cowling look with a four blade configuration. The Mk II would become the aircraft’s most produce (20 units) model. Construction of the II ran until the summer of 1938. The remaining Is were converted to model II specifications from May of that same year.

The Saro London prototype, K3560. (photo, via author)

The first operational A.27s was assigned to the No. 201 Squadron at Calshot where they replaced the venerable Supermarine Southampton. No. 204 squadron at Mount Batten also received deployments of the London. In 1937, five A.27s of the No. 201′s were selected to represent the RAF on the 150th anniversary of the founding of the State of New South Wales.

Between the spring of 1937 and the autumn of 1938, the 204 Squadron utilized five, specially modified Londons for long distance training missions. The converted A.27, carrying external auxiliary fuel tanks, flew from the British capital to Australia demonstrating the type’s long range operational capability. The round trip covered 48,280km in distance.

The London was still on active, frontline service when World War II broke in 1939. The A.27s assigned to 201 Squadron were stationed at Sullom Voe in Shetland, the ones of 204 were deployed to the main RAF base at Invergordon. Another squadron, No. 202, received several Londons at its operational base on Gibraltar.

All A.27s were primarily use as maritime reconnaissance platforms. Operating mainly on the North Sea and in the western Mediterranean Sea, they scanned the vast sea lanes in search for signs of the dreaded U-boats.
Aircraft based at Gibraltar served until April 1941, when they were replaced by the more modern Consolidated Catalina flying boats.

Beside the RAF, the Royal Canadian Air Force utilized the aircraft during the mid stages of the Second World War.

- Raul Colon

More information:
wikipedia: Saro London
Aeroplane Photographic Archive
Saro A.27 London I K3560
Flight Archive
Saro A.27 London

Gloster Rocket

The development of the jet engine revolutionized the design of both military and civilian aircraft, but it was the former, particularly the fighter platform, which benefited first. Frank Whittle’s achievement in developing the jet has been well covered, but the task of producing the first generation of aircraft designed to use his engines, mainly by the Gloster Aircraft Company, is not so well documented, especially some of its most obscure, early projects. One of those ‘block’ projects was the little know Gloster Rocket fighter.

The ‘Rocket’ proposal was briefly mentioned in an August 1943 declaration paper. In it, the company stated that “it marked the introduction of a new design for a fighter and shows the possibility of a future important advance along the road towards ultimate development. It outlines the prospect of achieving a low-level speed of 550 miles per hour and a climb rate, commencing at sea level, of around 9,000 feet per minute’.

The original Rocket design was similar in scope as the Gloster E.5/42 Ace, which although popular in many circles, never passed out of the mock-up stages. The main difference between the two proposals was the Rocket’s twin side-by-side engine installation which served almost as a single operating unit. Two prototypes Rolls-Royce B.37s occupied the same position in the rear fuselage area as the Halford engine had occupied in the original E.5/42 Ace. Of course, the air frame’s width was modified in order to accommodate the new format. The extra width was just about the level necessary to duct the air intakes on either side of the frontal frame section. Gloster engineers believed that the combine thrust of the two units, when fully developed, would be around 5,000lb. This increase on power was much more than could be effectively utilized from a single power plant in a similar aircraft-type.

Nevertheless, there were no profound differences between the E.5/42 and the Rocket. Those which could actually be seen were basically that of the fuselage length and the center wing structure. The frontal part of the airplane, outer wing sections, the undercarriage and tailplane were almost identically. The front part design was one of the first ergonomically concepts ever conceived. Besides housing the all important pressure cockpit, the section was filled with state of the art sensors and other related materials. The Rocket model was expected to use the newly high speed wing structure developed by the Royal Aircraft Establishment for the E.28/39 project.

Model of the Gloster Rocket. (photo, via author)

Because it similarities with the E.5/42, Gloster expected that full production, if ordered, would had been shift and relative, easy. The Rocket would have been fitted with B.37 engines. Each of them would supply around 2,200 pounds of thrust given the aircraft a top speed of 545mph at sea level. Climb rate was to be 7,650′ per minute. Operational ceiling was estimated to be at 55,000 feet.

On the morning of August 31st 1943, Gloster’s managers reported to Whittle about the possibility of installing the vaunted W4.100 engine on the E.5/42 platform. The idea was quickly nixed because it was ‘not a very suitable solution’ according to Whittle. Still, the inventor was reluctant to accept the tandem configuration. Early on the program life, the RAE and Gloster estimated that the Rocket pure, raw speed would be at around 449mph at sea leave. Impressive, but far below what the Royal Air Force desired.

On October 9th, Frank Whittle meet with Dr. Roxbee Cox and several high members of the RAE at Ministry of Aircraft Production. The conference centered on a new project, the M.52 supersonic research airplane and the Rocket. Whittle, now a full doubter of the whole twin engine configuration on the Rocket concept, stated that ‘if they (RAE) are going for a super fighter (Rocket), an aero plane which has not yet gone beyond the drawing stage, they should make a proper job and put it the most suited power plant, instead of fiddling with several units’.

No definitely conclusion was reach in the meeting. Engineers at Gloster would continued to work on the drawing for several more months before the whole idea was shelved in favor of a similar, but vastly more promising one: the E.1/44 Ace.

- Raul Colon

References:
Gloster Aircraft since 1917, Derek James, Putnam Books 1971
Interceptor, James Goulding, Ian Allan 1986

The Red Air Force: 1974 to 1985

The years between 1974 and 1985 brought many changes to the Soviet Union’s Air Force (SAF). Changes that augmented the SAF’s overall combat capability almost to a point of challenging the West invaluable air dominance in the projected battlefield. This was a dramatic shift that caught many Westerns observers by surprise. After decades of overall decay in the SAF’s structural profile, the 1970s ushered as new era in air operational planning. The Kremlin had finally woken to what conventional air power was really about.

Since its creation, the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) had planned to counter the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact ground and air forces with their high tech air forces. At the front point of this assumption rested the idea that the Western powers could bring heavy concentration of fire to bear with extreme speed and unmatched accuracy at any point in the battle. It was always understood that, even if NATO had the manpower in strategic reserve to counter an all out attack by the Warsaw ground forces, the incorporation of those forces into the defensive forward positions would have taken time. It would not arrive in time to stall a Soviet-lead push into Western Europe. How to contain the Warsaw ground forces from breaking out.

A Tu-95 Bear-C escorted by US Navy F-4s. (photo, via author)

For NATO, air power filled this gap. It offered the ability to strike hard and repeatedly at the choke points along the two Germany’s frontiers where the Warsaw land offensive would have to squeeze through. At the same time, tactical implementation of air power would be projected strategically because a large amount of American tactical aircraft would fly to Europe in the event of an all out attack. The concept of Allied air power holding the front against a Soviet ground incursion, provided there were enough deployed aircraft to do it, was valid and reassuring, especially since the performance of modern tactical Allied aircraft, and the effectiveness and accuracy of their weapons, had climbed exponentially on the back of commercially competitive Western technology to achieve an overall capability undreamt of in term of World War II. Inside NATO’s war planning, this air superiority had long been a comfortable thought of state that many believed that it would endure forever. Bu by the early 1980s, the situation looked different.

Red Air Force combat jet aircraft made its world debuted in the Korean skies during the 1950s affair. By the early 1970, all of those, first generation aircraft, were withdrawn from active service. The second generation of fighters and bombers, originally designed in the late 50s and early 60s, reached its developmental peak in the early 70s.
By the mid 80s, only about 10 to 15 percent of second generation air platforms remained in front line service as the third generation began to assert itself on the overall force structure. Third generation fighters and bombers made their debuted in the early 1970s thus its numbers rose steadily through the decade. It was this generation that gave the Red Air Force a broadly force structure comparable to that of its Western counterparts, although the later were still reckoned to have a margin in detail capability in all aspects, especially where this was dependent on electronics and weapon technology.

A pair of IL-28 Beagle bombers. (photo, via author)

On sheer numbers of available airframes, the Warsaw Pact had always outstripped those of the Allies, in the mid 80s; broad parity in performance was also within its grasp. Added to the equation was the Soviet’s monumental investments in research and development with dwarfed that of all NATO nations combine, with the exception of the US. A fourth generation platform was well under development by the middle of US President Ronald Reagan’s first term. By 1985, the Red AF was in the process of completing pre-evaluation of its fourth generation, air superiority fighter. A platform sorely intended to out maneuver the premier US air superiority aircraft, the vaunted F-15 Eagle. The Soviets were also working on a dedicated V-STOL aircraft for naval operations.
In the summer of 1985, analysis estimated Russian tactical air forces in the western section of the country had increased by 35 percent. The Soviet naval air arm was also climbing. The number of strategic airlift airplanes and attack helicopter quadrupled between 1974 and 1985. In twenty five years, 1970 onward, the Red AF increased their operational scope and war-load capacity by a staggering 1000 percent. The air force progress was as equally impressive as the Red Navy’s. Admiral Gorshkov gets much of the credit, and deservedly so, for the development of the Navy’s Blue Water aspects; but Soviet AF generals are to be praised for the formation of a top rated force.

With its overall new power projection capability, the Red Air Force possessed the capability to venture into the Atlantic and engage NATO’s European targets, including the most important air bridge base in the Continent; the United Kingdom. A though inconceivable in 1970. The new found Red air power could, if the pattern continued for one more decade, have made the deployment of US strategic reserve units into Continental Europe that much difficult, if not impossible. In conclusion, Soviet generals believed that they were just 10 to 15 years away from having a war winning air strategy.

- Raul Colon